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The history of US marijuana policy is predominantly that of prohibition 
and strict enforcement. There was however a period under Presidents Ford and 
Carter where this policy came under a great deal of scrutiny and criticism. Two 
influential reports in the Marijuana Commission(Commission and others, 1972), 
and the White Paper on Drug Abuse(Force, 1975) came out in favour of 
decriminalization, a number of states decriminalized, and the American Bar 
Association and The National council of churches also supported 
decriminalization of Marijuana. The country was tired of a war on drugs and as 
Ford tried to distance himself from Nixon’s trademark policies, those advocating 
strictly enforced prohibitionist policy found themselves, for the first time since 
marijuana was made illegal, with adversaries that could wield real political 
power. While a number of factors converged to bring the decriminalization of 
marijuana to the government’s agenda, having a sitting President in Jimmy 
Carter and Drug Czar in Peter Bourne publicly and actively endorsing such a 
policy was, and still is, unprecedented. This coincided with the pro legalization 
group NORML being led by a particularly savvy entrepreneur in Keith Stroup, 
while those on the side of prohibition were struggling to find a unifying voice as 
the Customs and the newly formed DEA fought bitterly. As marijuana 
consumption had moved from the fringes of immigrants groups into mainstream 
white American culture, societal attitudes toward the drug were also changing. 
Policy makers were coming to terms with their own children’s experimentation 
with the drug and the narrative of marijuana as a killer drug was loosing 
credibility with the general population. In order to better understand the forces 
that pushed federal decriminalization of marijuana to the governments agenda, 
the agenda setting theory of policy windows is applied. This theory contends 
that, in order for legislative change to occur, an issue must gain prominence as a 
problem over and above other competing issues. The policy community must 
have the technicalities of a solution for this problem worked out, and the 
solution must be politically viable.  As a theory, policy windows is criticized for 
not taking into account the historical trajectory of an issue. In order to allow for 
this, the first section looks at the history of marijuana prohibition and its 
architect Harry J. Anslinger, as well as the rise of the counter culture and the 
impact of the huge increase in drug use during the 1960s and early 70s. The bulk 
of the writing centers around the application of policy windows to marijuana law 
under the Ford and Carter administrations and the final section compares and 
contrasts the forces that pushed but ultimately prevented federal marijuana law 
reform under Carter with the forces that are at play today. During Jimmy Carters 
presidency it would seem that while forces in the policy and problem streams 
were strong enough to allow for federal decriminalization of marijuana, the 
political realities and level of conviction of those that opposed it, both within 
government and in the general population, were far more powerful than those 
proposing decriminalization had anticipated. In the current climate however, 
those advocating the liberalization of drug policies can point to the racial 
inequalities that are exacerbated by the drug war, as well as the destabilization 
of supplier countries such as Mexico in order to bolster the moral force of their 
argument. This in conjunction with the data from aboard and domestically that 
decriminalisation of marijuana is a policy that can work in the long term, and the 
economic benefit of legalizing states, mean that the current political climate is 

















History of Drug Prohibition 
In order avoid a study that is devoid of political and historical precedent, this 
chapter aims to canvas the history of U.S. drug policy from the 1930s until the 
start of Nixon’s second term in the 1970s. The goal of this chapter is not to 
produce a comprehensive history of federal drug policy, as that is not within the 
scope of this project, and it has been attempted by more qualified individuals 
and in much greater works. In attempting a complete history, I would run the 
risk of placing too great an emphasis on certain events or characters, while 
ignoring others that are particularly pertinent to the story. However, to dive into 
an analysis of drug policy under the Carter Administration without any reference 
to the past runs even greater risks, especially considering that one of the major 
critiques of Kingdon’s (2011) policy windows framework, which underpins the 
present study, is that it does not consult history in order to gain insights into 
long-term policy cycles (Mucciaroni, 1992). Therefore, the purpose of this 
chapter is, with reference to academic literature cited previously, to create a 
context with which to view the application of policy windows theory to 
marijuana laws under the Carter Administration.  
 The academic literature of the late 1970s tended to portray harm 
reduction and liberalisation of drug laws as a fait accompli, the authors confident 
in the notion that the U.S. would not return to the failed policies of Prohibition 
and the lack of coherent results evident in the failed Nixon initiative, the so-
called War on Drugs (Rock, 1977). Politically, there seems to be a collective 
amnesia around drug control measures that have been instituted in the past, and 
while the complaint of a lack of historical example is often cited when it comes to 
issues of public policy, Franklin Zimmring (1992, p. 45) states that, “even given 
the dismal norm for historical awareness in policy debates, the immunity to 
historical evidence that characterises the contemporary discussion of drugs in 
the United States is peculiarly pervasive”. Gore Vidal (1973, p. 374) voiced this 
sentiment even more pointedly in a New York Times piece on drug abuse, making 
the remark that, when it came American drug policy, “[it] always existed in a 
kind of time vacuum … [with] no public memory of anything that happened 
before last Tuesday”. 
An example of the typically complete lack of reference to the past can be 
found in the 1989 National Drug Control Strategy (The White House, 1989), 
which stated that “our drug problem is getting worse” without reference to the 
reasons for both Nixon’s 1971 and Reagan’s 1982 failed drug initiatives. 
Furthermore, the National Drug Control Strategy boldly claimed that America 
was experiencing “the worst epidemic of illegal drug use in history … far more 
severe, in fact, than any ever experienced by an industrialised nation” (The 
White House, 1989, p. 3). The veracity of this statement is doubtful, especially 
considering the high levels of drug dependence in the post-Civil War period and 
the twin peak in Americans’ drug use that occurred in the late 1970s. The upshot 
of this unwillingness to look back and to learn from past failures of drug policies 
is “an almost verbatim repetition of sentiments and standpoints that each 
succeeding orator seems convinced are being uttered for the first time” (Zimring, 
1992, p. 45).  
Choosing to look back at the history of drug policy does create other 
issues, however. Arguably, drug use is a complicated cultural phenomenon that 
does not react significantly to changes in government policy (Zimring, 1992, p. 
74), but rather increases or decreases based on “individual choices of lifestyle 
and values” (Slaughter, 1987, p. 470). Indeed, research conducted in a myriad of 
cities with marked differences in legal environments and enforcement practices 
found that “government policy has no effect on cannabis use” (Hall, 2004, p. 
161). For more conservative political commentators who would highlight the 
decrease in marijuana use under the Reagan Administration and the sharp 
increase in the early 1990s under Clinton’s regime, this analysis may be hard to 
accept, yet liberal scholars would, in stark contrast, point to the increases in 
other substances abused during the same respective time periods. Furthermore, 
liberal scholars may have a legitimate point in highlighting quantitative figures 
illustrating the abject failure of Nixon’s War on Drugs.  
In the debate revolving around the efficacy of the U.S. Government’s drug 
policy, the lessons from (alcohol) Prohibition in 1920–1933 often come to the 
fore, with some analysts claiming Prohibition failures to be so uncontroversial as 
to require little if any documentation (Tyrrell, 1997), yet even this claim is avidly 
countered, with other conservative scholars suggesting that perhaps Prohibition 
was a success in that there was a 30% decline in alcohol consumption. 
Furthermore, while Prohibition did produce a black market in Chicago and New 
York with the associated corruption of public officials, it is unclear how 
widespread the ill effects of the black market really were; in fact, it could be 
argued that subsequent Hollywood gangster movies have blown the issue out of 
all proportion (Hall, 2004, p. 157).  
Those in favour of a harm reduction approach often claim that they are 
only interested in whatever policies alleviate suffering; however, “utilitarian 
arguments sometimes appear to weigh costs and benefits in an objective 
manner, yet they assign these weights based on underlying perceptions of right 
and wrong that often reflect a sense of morals or rights” (Earleywine, 2002, p. 
226). The essence here is that when it comes to formulating drug policy, 
everyone comes to the table with values and morals that guide their decisions on 
what seems to be the best course of action. There is no such thing as a purely 
rational drug policy. 
Not only is drug policy complicated, often counter-intuitive and value-
laden, it is also open to political manipulation. Much of the published academic 
literature refers to racial drivers behind drug laws and the harm that has been 
brought to bear on minority communities as a result, which began in 1875 when 
San Francisco officials instituted the first anti-opium laws (Musto, 2002, p. x; 
Falco, 1996, p. 120; Jensen and Gerber, 1998, p. 21; Bonnie and Whitebread, 
1974a, p. 36). One prominent scholar argues that the driver behind this 
legislation was the excess of seemingly idle Chinese labour after the completion 
of the Trans-Continental Railroad (Musto, 1991), and that this issue was used to 
demonise the Chinese and to justify a swathe of anti-Chinese immigration 
legislation. Likewise, when the Great Depression started to bite, U.S. states with 
large numbers of immigrant Mexican and Caribbean workers were the first to 
institute anti-cannabis statutes (Jensen and Gerber, 1998, p. 9). During this time, 
marijuana use was far from mainstream, being mostly associated with jazz 
musicians, the avant-garde and Mexican immigrant farm workers (Levinson, 
2002, p. 18). It was a substance with which the population at large had little, if 
any, knowledge or experience with.  
Accordingly, “lurid tales of violent crimes committed by allegedly 
marijuana-crazed criminals ran in the popular press of the 1920s and 1930s, 
filling the vacuum of knowledge about cannabis” (Slaughter, 1987, p. 419). In one 
government pamphlet from 1935, it was estimated that 50% of the violent 
crimes committed in areas populated by Mexicans, Spaniards, Latin Americans, 
Greeks or Negros were related to marijuana use, and the pamphlet went on to 
state that “prolonged use of marijuana frequently develops a delirious rage 
which sometimes leads to high crimes such as assault and murder. Hence 
marijuana has been called the ‘killer drug’” (Jensen and Gerber, 1998, p. 10).  
Alongside the racial and surplus labour arguments explaining motivations 
for enacting drug legislation are economic factors. Scholars argue that the 
primary motivation behind initial marijuana legislation was the desire to end the 
hemp industry, thus removing a major competitor to wood pulp for paper 
(Earleywine, 2002, p. 231), or that, in more recent times, the drug war has been 
used as a guise for American military and economic involvement in strategic 
foreign nations (Blackman, 2004, p. 46; Chomsky, 2010). The prison industrial 
complex also benefits financially from drug prohibition, and its lobbyists work 
hard to keep drug violation penalties harsh (Jarecki, 2012)  
In addition to the potentially confounding ulterior motives and counter-
intuitive nature of drug policy, it is very difficult to collect accurate data about 
drug use and economics from a black market. In saying this, it does seem to be in 
the best interests of everyone involved in drug legislation to overstate the 
problem, whether they are pro- or anti-drug. Drug enforcement bureaucracies 
receive more funding if drug use is seen to be growing; pro-legalisation groups 
such as the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) 
point to high rates of cannabis use as a rationalisation for legalising it, arguing 
that it cannot be doing that much harm if millions of Americans are regular users 
and that the government is missing out on a huge source of tax revenue. Added 
to this maelstrom, the media, which benefits from sensational stories about big 
drug busts and high use rates, produces facts and figures that are murky to begin 
with and have a tendency to be blown out of all proportion. 
 The next section focuses on the well-known historic figure, Harry J. 
Anslinger and his effects on marijuana policy and public thought, which lasted 
well beyond his retirement in 1962. Key moments in the rise of the counter-
culture under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson and the skyrocketing rates 
of marijuana use are described, followed by an account of President Nixon’s War 
on Drugs. The intent is to set the stage for the heart of the current research, 
which has been explored already in the preceding section on the softening social 
and political attitudes towards drug use that occurred during the Ford (1974–
1977) and Carter (1977–1981) regimes. 
 
The Anslinger Era 
Harry J. Anslinger was a man who almost single-handedly forged the direction of 
U.S. domestic and international narcotics control policy. He was born into the 
Progressive Era (from the 1890s to the 1920s); he achieved his first political 
breakthrough by gaining British cooperation in enforcing the Volstead Act. His 
30-year tenure as head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) helped 
galvanise American attitudes towards drug users, marking them as criminals in 
need of criminal justice, rather than promoting the notion that drug abuse 
should be seen as a public health issue (Erlen and Spillane, 2004, p. 61). 
Anslinger’s tenacity gave him the ability to shut down more moderate views on 
drug policy, and his political savviness gave him the foresight to attach drug 
policy to whatever the hot topic of the day was, from an excess of immigrant 
labour during the Depression, to making narcotics a war issue during World War 
Two (WWII), to portraying drug use as part of the imagined Communist Plot of 
the 1950s. Anslinger was a gifted bureaucrat and believed strongly in the 
immorality of drug use. He served under five presidential administrations, and 
during his career, he was often referred to in the media, the Congressional 
Record and contemporary journals as the world expert on narcotic drugs (Erlen 
and Spillane, 2004, p. 65). 
In a book he co-authored, titled The Murders (Anslinger and Oursler, 
1961), Anslinger recounted the story of how, as a youth, he heard a woman 
screaming in agony and felt sure she would die. Eventually, the woman’s 12-
year-old son returned with morphine from the drugstore. The woman was 
instantly quietened, and in retrospect, Anslinger was amazed that such a potent 
substance was available over the counter at a drugstore, even to children (Erlen 
and Spillane, 2004, p. 63). 
 This early fascination with drug policy lay dormant for many years while 
Anslinger worked as a diplomat in Germany during World War One (WWI), after 
which he worked in the Hague and Hamburg and became quite concerned with 
Bolshevik imperialist tendencies. The State Department in Washington, D. C. did 
not share his concerns, however, and essentially ignored his warnings of 
Bolshevik revolutionaries moving to the U.S. en masse. Anslinger believed the 
intelligence work he was conducting was of great value and felt that his 
subsequent relocation to La Guairá, Venezuela was a serious backward step in 
his career.  
 During this time, however, Anslinger used the diplomatic skills he had 
picked up in Europe to persuade the British to start issuing landing certificates. 
This system allowed the British to keep a record of all ship movements in the 
Bahamas and helped restrict bootlegged rum from making it to the U.S. This 
surprising diplomatic achievement was rewarded with a temporary detail to the 
Prohibition Unit, and by 1929, Anslinger had become the Assistant 
Commissioner of Prohibition (Musto, 1999a, p. 210). He regarded this position as 
“a thankless and impossible assignment” (Erlen and Spillane, 2004, p. 64), yet he 
pursued the cause with vigour, out of loyalty to the law of his country.  
 All through his role as a Prohibition agent, Anslinger believed the 
Volstead Act was failing due to a lack of enforcement. He believed that the law 
lacked dissuasive power, and that the way to remedy this was to not only outlaw 
the sale, but also the purchase of liquor, and to include severe first-time offense 
penalties, such as a $5,000–$50,000 fine and a 2- to 5-year prison term (Musto, 
1999a, p. 210). This strict enforcement, which was symptomatic of Protestant 
Prohibitionist ideology, continued with Anslinger throughout his career and 
pervades drug policy thinking to this day. Along with his black-and-white take on 
substance use, he was seen as trustworthy and incorruptible, which was not the 
norm with Prohibition and Narcotics Agents in the late 1920s. Anslinger was 
chosen to replace Levi Nutt as head of the Narcotics Division when accusations of 
corruption were levelled at Nutt. Anslinger was seen as a man untainted by 
corruption, which helped him become the Head of the Narcotics Division, later 
re-named the FBN (Musto, 1999a, p. 209). Although he had no relevant medical 
training with which to devise policy regarding drug use, Anslinger’s experiences 
in diplomacy in post-WWI Europe were seen to be more relevant to his role, as 
the drug problem was starting to become more of an international than a 
domestic issue (Erlen and Spillane, 2004, p. 64).  
Having taken over the FBN, Anslinger embarked on a campaign to have 
marijuana made federally illegal, which was eventually achieved in 1937 with 
the passing of the Marijuana Tax Act. He used the public lack of knowledge 
regarding marijuana to portray its effects in a substantially slanted way. 
Anslinger launched a media campaign warning of the dangers of marijuana at a 
crucial time, when there was an excess of labour nationwide due to the 
Depression, and many ethnic minorities were used as scapegoats for economic 
issues. Popular scapegoats included Mexicans who had fled their nation’s civil 
war a decade earlier in order to find work in the U.S. Many prominent scholars 
(Blackman, 2004; Falco, 1996; Musto, 1999a; Trujillo, 2011; Winterbourne, n.d.) 
suggest that policy makers and legislators combined economic factors with racial 
prejudices in order to produce legislation that was aimed at reducing 
competition with White workers and to assert the racial dominance of White 
America. Anslinger claimed that 50% of the violent crimes committed by 
Mexicans, Turks, Filipinos, Greeks, Spaniards, Latin-Americans and Negroes 
were as a result of marijuana addiction (Winterbourne, n.d., p. 97). In a letter 
published in the Alamosa Daily Courier, Anslinger wrote: 
 
I wish I could show you what a small marihuana cigarette can do 
to one of our degenerate Spanish-speaking residents. That’s why 
our problem is so great; the greatest percentage of our population 
is composed of Spanish-speaking persons, most of whom are low 
mentally, because of social and racial conditions. (Trujillo, 2011, p. 
15) 
 
Anslinger also made full use of the Hollywood movie screen to warn of the 
dangers of marijuana by pushing for the production of such films as Marijuana — 
Weeds with Roots in Hell, Reefer Madness, and Assassin of Youth (Blackman, 2004, 
p. 56). At this time in the U.S., the general population had little knowledge of 
marijuana and its effects, as it was mostly used by fringe elements in society, 
such as Mexican migrant labour and those involved in the burgeoning jazz 
movement. Consequently, Anslinger was able to cultivate whatever public 
opinion he liked regarding the drug, regardless of the lack of evidence suggesting 
a correlation between marijuana use and violent crime (Trujillo, 2011, p. 14). 
The general lack of experience with marijuana and its users, coupled with the 
ethos of the era in which Anslinger ran his propaganda campaign against ‘pot’, 
which was defined by tough economic times and the unprecedented popularity 
of eugenics, made his efforts to demonise marijuana and to make it federally 
outlawed extremely successful (Reiman, n.d., p. 110).  
 The driving force behind the passing of the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 was 
the claimed link between violent crime and marijuana use. In pushing for this tax 
legislation, which would effectively outlaw marijuana, Anslinger used emotive 
propaganda with good effect: “how may murders, suicides, robberies, criminal 
assaults, hold-ups, burglaries, and deeds of maniacal insanity it [marijuana] 
causes each year, especially among the young, can only be conjectured” (Kaplan, 
1970, p. 134). The implication in the above quote is that marijuana causes users 
to commit a great number of crimes, yet the literal reading of this quote is more 
accurate. At the time, Anslinger had no solid evidence that marijuana caused any 
of the above-listed crimes; the effects of the drug really could only be 
conjectured.  
 Initially, when Anslinger first looked at the possibility of having marijuana 
made federally illegal, he thought the Supreme Court would see this move as 
overstepping constitutional bounds, but when the National Firearms Act was 
passed in 1934 in order to restrict gang access to high-powered weapons, the 
FBN saw an opportunity to lobby for similar legislation (Musto, 1999a, p. 222), 
with one key difference. The objective of the firearms legislation was to restrict 
the number of publicly available dangerous weapons, whereas with the 
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, one had to purchase a stamp allowing possession, 
and the government had no intention of issuing any stamps; therefore, all 
marijuana was illegal (Trujillo, 2011, p. 15). 
The Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 passed with little fanfare and with just one 
opponent and one proponent speaking. The entire debate lasted less than 2 
minutes, after which the Marijuana Tax Act, which mislabelled marijuana as a 
narcotic, was passed. The names of those who voted for or against the Act were 
not even recorded (Levinson, 2002, p. 19). Zimring (1992, p. 79) and Reiman 
(n.d., p. 109) note that the lack of front-end friction in the passing of the bill 
coupled with the absence of debate during its passage suggests marijuana was 
only being used by small portions of fringe elements in American society, and 
was not the widespread public menace that the FBN would have had Congress 
believe. Anslinger had used the political connections he had fostered in his time 
as a Prohibition agent to good effect during his campaign to pass the 1937 Act, 
because he managed to enlist the support of many prominent societies including 
the Anti-Salon Club, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union and the 
Federation of Womens Clubs, focusing on the danger marijuana was to school 
children (Musto, 1999a, p. 14). It may be that the effect of the scare tactics used 
to pass the 1937 legislation (Wisotsky, 1990) was to “ruin any chance of seeing 
the drug issue as anything but black and white, good and evil” (Reiman, n.d., p. 
109). 
During WWII, any expenditure that was not seen as being directly related 
to the war effort was slashed to the bone, and it looked as though even the FBN 
may have been in danger of being swallowed up by other agencies; however, 
Anslinger was able to successfully link marijuana use and possession to draft 
dodging (Erlen and Spillane, 2004, p. 78), and this astute move saved the agency. 
In the post-WWII environment under the direction of Harry Anslinger, the FBN 
moved away from using racial fears to institute and to uphold harsh drug laws, 
and instead tied drug use to the Communist agenda. This political ideology, 
known after the fact as “Drug McCarthyism” (Blackman, 2004, p. 37), required 
little in the way of verifiable statistics to justify draconian drug laws. The Daniel 
Subcommittee of Senators 1956 stated, “subversion through drug addiction is an 
established aim of Communist China” (Blackman, 2004, p. 37). During the 1950s, 
“a spy was behind every tree and a narcotics peddler right behind him … The two 
sinister characters behind the tree were perceived to be one and the same” 
(Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974b, p. 209). 
The reality of the situation was that marijuana and other drug use was 
still relatively low, and drugs were only used by people in the fringes of society, 
such as the emerging beatniks. During the 1950s, drug use was seen as 
unpatriotic, with some experts predicting use of illicit drugs to be in its “death 
throws” (Rosenberger, 1996, p. 19).  
In 1945, the U.S. Government commissioned the La Guardia Report, which 
rejected two important concepts: 1) the link between marijuana use and violent 
insanity; and 2) the “gateway theory” that marijuana use leads to the use of more 
potent substances such as heroin (Blackman, 2004, p. 18). Anslinger successfully 
discredited the report, writing it off as being produced by “self-styled experts, 
bleeding hearts, axe-grinders, and meddling do-gooders” (King, 1972, p. 71). The 
FBN came down so hard on the study that it forced the American Medical 
Association (AMA) to withdraw its original approval of the report (Bonnie and 
Whitebread, 1974b, p. 201). This about-face was indicative of the FBN’s reaction 
to anyone questioning the drug propaganda that it was producing.  
While marijuana and narcotic use were still in their infancy, the issuance 
of penalties for possession and distribution increased dramatically. In legislation 
reminiscent of Anslinger’s recommendations to strengthen the Volstead Act, the 
1951 Boggs Act was passed. It required a minimum 2-year prison term for 
possession of any amount of marijuana, a provision that Anslinger believed to be 
“the single most effective deterrent to violation of drug laws” (Erlen and Spillane, 
2004, p. 84). The passing of the Boggs Act 1951 was seen as the final nail in the 
coffin of drugs as an issue, as the FBN thought “the whole United States might be 
made too hot for drug-peddlers” (Erlen and Spillane, 2004, p. 89). Those few that 
opposed the Act thought the collateral damage of such indiscriminate legislation, 
while catching a few of the guilty, would inflict a disproportionate amount of 
damage on the innocent (Erlen and Spillane, 2004, p. 88).  
The passing of the Boggs Act 1951 was the zenith of Anslinger’s career, 
and subsequently, his approach to narcotics control started to lose credibility as 
larger sections of the population came into contact with marijuana, prompting 
demands for a re-evaluation of drug policy (Musto, 1999a, p. 238). As Anslinger’s 
career began to wane, reports by the American Bar Association (ABA) and the 
AMA, as well as W.G. Eldrides’s Narcotics and the Law, promoted a more nuanced 
view of drug policy. The counter-culture was growing rapidly, and scare tactics, 
which had been so successful at curbing drug use up till this point, were no 
longer the ticket. In 1962, Anslinger retired, not long after the election of John F. 
Kennedy, and he was succeeded by Harry Giodano, a pharmacist who was 
considered, in terms of policy, “much more reasonable” (Musto, 1999a, p. 238). 
Harry J. Anslinger is often portrayed as a racist moral crusader who 
seized the opportunity during the Depression to grow his FBN ambitions by 
grossly exaggerating the links between marijuana use and violent maniacal 
crime, especially crimes committed by ethnic minorities. He used the lobbying 
contacts he had acquired during his time as a Prohibition officer to good effect, 
and masterfully tied drug use to the war effort during WWII and to Communist 
subversion in the post-war era. His legacy of scare tactics and harsh penalties 
override education and rehabilitation and continue to dominate the drug policy 
narrative, both domestically and internationally.  
On the other hand, drug use was at an all-time low during Anslinger’s 3-
decade tenure as Commissioner of the FBN, and while it is doubtful he fully 
believed all of the propaganda that his bureau produced, it could be argued that 
his approach was warranted on an ‘ends-justify-the-means’ basis. The charge 
that he exaggerated the drug threat in order to grow his bureaucracy and to 
increase his personal power in the government seems doubtful, as he prided 
himself on never asking for an increase in funding for the FBN (Musto, 1973, p. 
234). Towards the end of his tenure, when drug treatment clinics were being 
more widely discussed, Anslinger did all he could to prevent them, even though 
their institution would have caused a massive increase of the size and budget of 
the FBN. In the end, Anslinger seems to be a product of the Progressive and 
Prohibitionist era. A man who saw morality in black-and-white terms, Anslinger 
definitely classed recreational drug use as morally wrong. He was a shrewd 
politician who knew how to attach his solution to the popular problem of the 
day. His heavy-handed approach kept a lid on substance abuse, yet it is doubtful 
he could have done anything to stem the explosion of drug use that occurred in 
the 1960s, and the legacy he left was a generation with grave distrust in what the 
authorities had to say regarding any drug, especially once they saw the wild 
disparity between what smoking marijuana really produced, and the outlandish 
propaganda peddled by the FBN. 
 
The John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Era 
Harry Giordano replaced Anslinger as head of the FBN in 1962, and he continued 
to advocate a law enforcement approach to drug abuse, yet his abilities as a 
bureaucrat were not as honed as Anslinger’s. Before the end of the decade, the 
FBN would be no more. Musto (2002a) attributes this demise to the bureau’s 
inability to adapt to the tumultuous social changes that were occurring. By 
refusing to engage with new ideas on how to deal with drug abuse (Musto, 
2002a, p. 6) and by continually referring to their previous 3 decades of success, 
the FBN identified itself as an outdated organisation incapable of moving 
forward into the optimistic “Great Society” that was being envisioned by U.S. 
leaders in the early 1960s.  
Weeks before the assassination of John F. Kennedy, a comprehensive 
study on drug abuse and its effects on America, produced by the Prettyman 
Commission, was completed and was ready to be published. It had been 
commissioned by the President as one of his first orders of business and was 
characterised by a three-prong approach to tackling the growing problem of 
drug abuse (Musto, 2002a, p. 1). In brief, these approaches were:  
 
1 A balancing of approaches between viewing the problem as a 
criminal justice issue as well as a public health issue (this opened 
the door for the increase in harm reduction strategies).  
2 A reorganisation of the bureaucracies involved in narcotics (the 
implementation of this idea saw the end of the FBN).  
3 Diplomatic efforts to reduce illegal drug supply from foreign 
nations (the first expression of this idea involved financial loans to 
Turkey in order to get poppy farmers to change to different 
crops). 
 
 While the Prettyman Report (1963) was not the first of its kind (the La 
Guardia Report [1945], for instance, relied on similar principles), it found far 
greater traction than its predecessors, because it was released when Great 
Society thinking was very much in political vogue and as the persuasive power of 
the FBN was declining. The report did receive criticism from the Treasury 
Department, which cited the proven track record of the FBN and its almost 
exclusively criminal justice approach to drug abuse (Musto, 2002a, p. 14). The 
Prettyman Report (1963) also received criticism from liberals such as W. B. 
Eldridge, author of Narcotics and the Law (1962), who, quite accurately, pointed 
out that “without examination, without explanation, the commission has, for 
most purposes, equated drug use and drug abuse” (Musto, 2002a, p. 8). Public 
response to the report, however, was “extremely favourable” (Musto, 2002a, p. 
12). Part of the reason for the greater impact realised by the Prettyman 
Commission was that it was willing to look at new and innovative ideas of 
dealing with the issue of drug abuse, yet its ideas were still based on moral 
foundations condemning drug use. Musto (2002a, p. 9) illustrates the importance 
of the Commission’s contribution: nearly all its recommendations found 
expression in one form or another in federal policy over the next four 
administrations and were adapted under later presidents; many are discernible 
in today’s revised policy statements.  
In line with the Prettyman Commission’s emphasis on balancing a 
criminal justice with a public health approach, Congress passed the Narcotics 
Addicts Rehabilitation Act (NARA) 1966, which specified narcotics addiction as a 
mental illness (Rosenberger, 1996, p. 20). Its original intent was to reform 
mandatory minimum sentences that had been put in place under the Boggs Act 
in the 1950s, but by the time NARA was ready to be passed, there was 
considerably more political pressure to be seen to be tough on crime. 
Consequently, the Act was unable to be passed in its original form (Musto, 2002a, 
p. 18). 
While laws were changing slowly and starting to engage with the idea of 
drug abuse as a public health issue, public perception was changing far more 
quickly. The Johnson Administration experienced what Bonnie and Whitebread 
(1974c, p. 223) referred to as the disintegration of the marijuana consensus. As 
already eluded to, the loss of a single strong anti-drug voice in the form of 
Anslinger had helped clear room for the growing number of elite voices that 
were questioning the effectiveness of simple punitive measures and their moral 
and constitutional validity. The Prettyman Commission Report (1963), being well 
received, signalled the beginning of this sea change. Genuine debate in elite 
policy circles focussed on whether addiction was a crime or a disease, a moral 
failing or a misfortune (Musto, 2002a, p. 6). What was truly unique about the 
mid-1960s was that for the first time in American history, drug use was 
advocated by outspoken practitioners from the middle and upper-middle class 
(Jonnes, 1996, p. 238). For example, the likes of Timothy Leary and Richard 
Alpert vehemently advocated the use of psychedelics and saw them as the 
gateway to the next step in human evolution (Jensen and Gerber, 1998, p. 12).  
While differing opinions were being considered in policy circles and in 
ivory towers, it was the massive increase in marijuana use, especially by the 
young middle class, that was the most important factor in bringing about the 
downfall of the anti-marijuana consensus. In the late 1950s, marijuana arrests 
and seizures were at an all-time low (Musto, 2002a, p. 24524), but these 
infringements grew steadily through the 1960s until marijuana use rates 
exploded in 1967, prompting Life magazine to state, “almost overnight the U.S. 
was embarked on the greatest mass flouting of the law since Prohibition” (Musto, 
2002a, p. 26). Between 1965 and 1970 arrests for marijuana offenses rose from 
20,000 to 190,000 (Slaughter, 1987, p. 420). Rather than being a substance 
associated with Black jazz musicians and Mexican migrant workers, middle-class 
Americans were either smoking pot, or knew people who were. As university 
campuses around the country became epicentres of drug use, public opinion 
turned away from locking up bright young university students for what was 
increasingly being seen as low-risk behaviour. The propaganda peddled by the 
FBN under Anslinger now had the opposite, unintended effect of discrediting all 
cautionary voices. The Baby Boomers went to university and adopted the 
position they voiced in an aphorism — “don’t trust anyone over 30”. This 
position was strengthened when the majority of users found marijuana to be a 
relatively mild intoxicant, with no sign of the violent Communist undertones 
supposedly connected to it arising. Marijuana use became an act to symbolise 
one’s alternative political, cultural and religious views (Musto, 2002a, p. 1), while 
simultaneously being seen by the WWII generation as symbolising an attack on 
cherished American values (Levinson, 2002, p. 2). Every generation has a certain 
desire to reinvent their culture, but no American generation before, or possibly 
after, the Baby Boomers had more money or more free time (Levinson, 2002, p. 
20), which combined with an unparalleled level of optimism that society really 
could be reinvented.  
 Even with the exponential increase in drug use (32% of university 
students had smoked marijuana by 1969), only 3% of the population saw drug 
abuse as one of the more important domestic issues, with racial tension, student 
unrest and inflation ranking substantially higher (Musto, 2002a, p. 38). While the 
charge can certainly be laid that later presidencies used the drug issue as a 
political football in order to galvanise support for issues unrelated to drug use, 
the Johnson Administration really did preside over a time of massive increases in 
drug use, violently shifting cultural and political movements, and for the most 
part, White House bureaucrats were playing catch-up in trying to create a 
coherent drug strategy. It was not until Nixon and his War on Drugs that a 
President really tapped into the political windfall that came with being seen as 
the leader who was “tough on drugs”. 
 
President Nixon 
Towards the end of the 1960s, Richard Nixon and his campaign team were 
looking for an issue that would mobilise their voting base. To “Middle America” 
(the middle class), it felt like things were spiralling out of control, both 
domestically and internationally, and Nixon’s planners fell on the issue of 
tougher drug sentences as a way to discredit the Great Society programmes 
(Musto, 2002, p. xviii) and to gain the law-and-order vote.  
 
Drug control bills offered the opportunity for politicians to 
express concern for the poor and the wretched (narcotics addicts) 
and for middle-class youth, whose misguided but understandable 
attempts at rebellion required both compassion and correction, 
while simultaneously lowering the boom on criminals. (Musto, 
2002a, p. 59) 
 
Before Nixon waged a campaign to increase the public visibility of drug 
abuse as the major problem facing the nation, polls showed that 1% of the 
population saw it as the most important issue (Musto, 2002a, p. 59). Crime, the 
war in Vietnam and escalating domestic unrest were, however, seen as major 
election issues, and the genius of the Nixon campaign team was that they were 
able to connect all these issues to that of drug policy. Most of Nixon’s planners 
tended to accept intuitively that there was a connection between drug use and 
crime, but even those who were not so sure did see the political potential of the 
issue. “The logic of the relationship between drugs and crime was easily 
communicated to the public, and the desirability of eliminating such a pernicious 
habit seemed self-evident” (Musto, 2002, p. xviii). 
It seemed that dealing with the problem of drug abuse was far less 
complex compared to the international disputes and domestic social issues that 
defied concrete political answers and results. To Nixon’s planners, tackling drug 
abuse seemed like a definitive move that they could make to halt the loss of 
traditional American values, and to ensure that their political party would reap 
the rewards for having done something (Musto, 2002a, p. 42). Part of the appeal 
of tackling the drug issue was that it would win support from Democratic, 
middle-class working White families, who saw their own party as leaning too far 
towards the student protestors and young African Americans (Jensen and 
Gerber, 1998, p. 12). 
Upon the election of President Nixon in 1968, the counter-culture was 
reaching its zenith. With the 1970s producing music and art festivals such as 
Woodstock and massive Vietnam War protests, high-profile celebrities and 
counter-cultural heroes were also overdosing with disturbing regularity. Nixon’s 
first attempt at drug control focused on the supply issue, with the advent of 
Operation Intercept, which aimed to stop the tons of marijuana that were 
crossing into the U.S. from Mexico. However, the operation was poorly planned, 
as inspecting every vehicle that crossed the border essentially shut off cross-
border trade, with a 70% reduction in U.S. tourist dollars making it to Mexico, 
while produce coming up to the U.S. from Mexico rotted in the long queues 
created by the border crackdown. Within a month, Operation Intercept was 
substantially scaled back and was relabeled Operation Cooperation. During this 
short time of decreased marijuana supply from Mexico, Columbia took up the 
slack, and domestic production also increased to satisfy demand (Rosenberger, 
1996, p. 22). 
For all the dubious motivations behind Nixon and his planners’ drive to 
raise drug abuse as a major national issue, they did produce a coherent, if 
imperfect, approach to drug policy. The federal anti-drug budget grew 4-fold 
from 1970 to 1974 (Sharp, 1992, p. 540). As part of the government response, 
more than a dozen federal agencies were shaken up in order to better deal with 
the perceived problem (Musto, 2002, p. xviii). While the rhetoric of the War on 
Drugs was conservative and somewhat simplistic in nature, the actual 
applications funded by increased budgets were far more left-leaning and harm 
reductionist than ever before (or after). Under Nixon, the ratio of treatment and 
rehabilitation spending to law enforcement spending increased from 0.78 to 1.75 
(Sharp, 1992, p. 541).  
As the fight for his second term in office was coming nearer, Nixon’s 
planners realised that they needed some way to claim concrete victories, such as 
reduced crime or successes in dealing with the problem of returning, drug-
addicted Vietnam War veterans. The need for quick answers to these tough 
issues led to possibly the most out-of-character drug policy implemented in 
recent U.S. federal history, that of methadone maintenance. A report identifying 
the major issues of the 1972 election stated:  
 
In 1972, citizens will be looking at crime statistics across the 
nation in order to see whether expectations raised in 1968 have 
been met. The federal government has only one economical and 
effective technique for reducing crime on the streets — 
methadone maintenance. (Musto, 2002a, p. 88) 
 
The lure of methadone as a silver bullet for reducing crime was part of 
what made the approach attractive, yet it was the alarmingly high amount of 
drug-using servicemen returning from Vietnam that demanded an approach 
other than that of harsh punitive measures. Historically, drug-using groups had 
tended to be a specific ethnic minority and had tended to be poorer; thus, it was 
easier to marginalise drug users as an outside minority. The problem with such 
high levels of addicted servicemen was that the government could not write 
them off as a group lacking in moral fibre that could be left to overdose or to be 
locked up (Musto, 2002a, p. 91). This scenario forced officials to believe that 
drug addiction was curable, and that it was not solely connected to moral failure. 
The “once and addict, always an addict” thinking that had been inherited from 
the Anslinger era needed to be rethought, as America’s best and brightest 
returned from Vietnam with addiction problems. Estimates from an Army 
psychiatrist suggested that 70% of his unit’s patients were heavy users of drugs 
and that between 50% and 80% of Army personnel in Vietnam had tried 
marijuana (Musto, 2002a, p. 50). Another drawcard to the harm reduction 
approach was that while methadone was, in its own right, a highly addictive 
substance associated with painful withdrawal symptoms, any heroin addict who 
could be put on a methadone programme could be omitted from estimates of the 
social costs of drug addiction (Rock, 1977, p. 157), thus making the statistics on 
drug use look much for favourable to a voting nation in 1972. Nixon was re-
elected by the second greatest margin in U.S. history, and Musto (2002a, p. 106) 
contends that “the administration’s approach to law and order issues in general 
and to drug abuse and related crime in particular played a part in the victory.”  
While there were great changes taking place in the treatment of heroin 
addicts, the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse (NCMDA), 
named the Shafer Commission after its Chairman Raymond P. Shafer, was busy 
releasing its findings. The rhetoric of Nixon’s 1973 campaign of being tough on 
crime and drugs did not gel well with the members of the Shafer Commission, 
which did not go as far as to suggest legalisation of marijuana, but did call for its 
decriminalisation (Slaughter, 1987, p. 423). The Shafer Commission Report 
(1972) was well-researched and well-written, but the timing for its release was 
unfortunate, as it did not coincide with Nixon’s re-election rhetoric (Musto, 
2002a, p. 113). In its report (1972), the Shafer Commission dismissed the link 
between marijuana use and violent crime and questioned the validity of the 
gateway theory, which held that marijuana use led to the use of harder drugs 
(Slaughter, 1987, p. 423). Furthermore, the Commission lamented the fact that 
“marijuana’s symbolism remains so powerful, obstructing the emergence of a 
rational policy” (Slaughter, 1987, p. 424), and President Nixon was left with no 
choice but to distance himself from the report’s findings. While the Shafer 
Commission was not given a great deal of respect when the report first came out, 
it was extremely influential when decriminalisation of marijuana was 
subsequently mooted under the Carter Administration. 
Nixon and his planners were undoubtedly concerned by the increase in 
drug abuse that occurred in the 1960s, but also saw the increase as a political 
opportunity to win the law-and-order vote in 1969 and as a way of showing 
concrete, positive results, which helped them win Nixon another term in 1973. 
They took the issue seriously and constructed a coherent strategy to deal with 
the drug abuse problem, which they dubbed the War on Drugs. While it has been 
criticised as an overly simplistic approach, they did try some innovative 
strategies such as their methadone maintenance programme. It was not until 
President Reagan took office that the U.S. saw a truly supply-side war waged, and 
with devastating consequences. Nixon’s legacy, however, was not the result of 
his cutting-edge harm reductionist approach, but was based on his black-and-
white War on Drugs rhetoric, which is still the prevailing paradigm for U.S. drug 
policy today. The Shafer Commission, which dealt primarily with marijuana 
policy, was essentially ignored by Nixon, as it would not have been politically 
wise for him to align himself with its findings right before the election. The 
report did, however, become far more important later in the decade when 
liberalising marijuana policy became a real political possibility. 
  
Kingdon’s Policy Windows Model 
John Kingdon’s book Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (1984, p. 1) 
attempts to paint a clear picture of the phenomenon of an “idea whose time has 
come”. In Kingdon’s view, items quickly appear on the legislative agenda, 
sometimes seemingly out of nowhere, only to disappear and never to return, 
while other issues remain on the periphery for decades, intermittently being 
thrust onto centre stage, to either be dealt with incrementally or to be solved 
once and for all by sweeping new legislation. Through his theory, Kingdon 
(1984) attempts to understand the processes that push an issue into politicians’ 
decision agendas. He supposes that in order for an issue to gain serious 
consideration by government, three streams must simultaneously converge 
(Kingdon, 1984); these streams are mostly independent of one another and 
cover the three areas of 1) problems, 2) policies and 3) politics. Kingdon’s (1984) 
contention is that only once a set of criteria for each of these three categories has 
been satisfied, may an issue rise to the top of politicians’ agendas to be 
considered in the legislature. Kingdon (1984, p. 174) refers to this occurrence as 
a “policy window”, noting that these windows do not stay open long before 
another issue comes to the fore. The following section outlines the key 
components to Kingdon’s (1984) theory and examines examples in the academic 
literature in which his theory has been applied to real policy issues, both current 
and historic. The following section also discusses the methodological approach 
appropriate for applying the policy windows theory to federal marijuana policy 
in the 1970s. 
 
The Three Streams 
The Problem Stream 
The problem stream consists of any issue that could be dealt with legislatively. 
However, most of these issues never make it onto the formal agenda, and not 
necessarily because of a lack of merit. Kingdon (1984) asserts that certain 
problems are recognised above others via three channels — indicators, focusing 
events and feedback. The first way of recognising a problem is by its indicators. 
These are regular statistics that provide information concerning the gravity of 
the problem and that include telling facts such as road toll numbers, Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) drug seizure figures or infant mortality rates. 
Kingdon (1984) notes that these figures can be mere blips in the data and that 
these anachronisms are not necessarily indicative of the gravity of the problem; 
however, Kingdon (1984) also acknowledges that a statistical anomaly can cause 
more attention to be given an issue than is necessarily warranted. “The 
countable problem sometimes acquires a power that is unmatched by problems 
that are less countable” (Kingdon, 1984, p. 97). 
 Specific events that push an issue to the top of the problem stream are 
labelled focusing events and can take the shape of a crisis, disaster or the 
personal experience of a policy maker (Kingdon, 1984, p. 100). Kingdon (1984, p. 
104) also notes that focusing events can have a cumulative effect, giving the 
example of airline safety being thrust far higher in the problem stream by two 
airline crashes in quick succession than by two aviation disasters separated by a 
year or two. Focusing events have a greater potential impact on some problems; 
for example, while the annual number of deaths on the road far exceeds that of 
airline crash fatalities, 100 simultaneous casualties caused by a single plane 
crash will have a greater focusing effect than 100 highway deaths over a number 
of weeks. 
 Feedback comes to legislative officials through a number of different 
channels ranging from formal channels, such as systematic monitoring and 
evaluation, to more sporadic channels such as letters of complaint (Kingdon, 
1984, p. 106). Feedback tends to have a cumulative effect on a problem, and if 




The problem stream can be very turbulent, and an issue may quickly rise to the 
top of the stream, only to be dunked back into relative insignificance by another 
problem that has gained the limelight through feedback, indicators or focusing 
events. Kingdon (1984) notes that “it takes time, effort, mobilisation of many 
actors, and the expenditure of political resources to keep an item prominent on 
the agenda” (Kingdon, 1984, p. 109); hence, it is unusual for a problem to stay on 
the political agenda long enough for serious consideration. Indeed, a problem 
may also fade once legislators perceive that is has been dealt with by the 
legislature, even if in a piecemeal, haphazard way. This is the reason some policy 
entrepreneurs would rather see no legislation passed at all, and would rather 
keep their problem near the top of the stream, rather than accept a watered-
down version of the solution and risk their movement losing steam. 
 
The Policy Stream 
The policy stream is the caucus where solutions to problems are created. This 
stream is fragmented, as it consists of many “policy communities” that harbour 
differing ideas as to the best legislative solution (Kingdon, 1984, p. 127). Within 
the policy stream, there is a great deal of freedom to propose solutions that are 
‘outside the box’. In order for a policy to rise to the top of the stream, however, it 
must gain enough momentum from a number of different angles, as spelled out 
by Kingdon (1984). Firstly, policy entrepreneurs bide their time and wait for a 
problem that they can attach their pet solution or policy to. A solution is more 
likely to rise to the top of the policy stream if it has talented entrepreneurs 
championing its effectiveness. Kingdon (1984) also notes that it is not all about 
the power of the entrepreneurs who are pushing the solution, but that the merits 
of the solution also have an effect. Political scientists are often fixated on the 
effects of special interest groups and vested interests, but Kingdon (1984, p. 
131), rather refreshingly, asserts that good ideas are more likely to rise than bad 
ones  
 Technical feasibility is another factor identified by Kingdon that affects 
whether or not an issue will rise above others in the policy stream. If the finer 
details are not worked out before legislative debate, a sound solution may be 
sunk due to an embarrassing oversight by the entrepreneurs pushing the 
legislation (Kingdon, 1984, p. 134). A solution must also line up with the values 
held by the policy community. Kingdon (1984, p. 140) calls this value 
acceptability, and no matter how effective the solution may seem to be, if it does 
not fulfil this criterion, the solution will likely not rise for consideration.  
 Along the same lines, but requiring mass value acceptability, is the idea of 
public acquiescence (Kingdon, 1984, p. 146). In this domain, solutions that go 
against public opinions are less likely to be considered. The problem and policy 
streams operate relatively independently of one another, yet Kingdon (1984) 
notes that “the chances for a problem to rise on the decision agenda are 
dramatically increased if a solution is attached” (Kingdon, 1984, p. 150). If a 
solution ticks all the aforementioned boxes such as technical feasibility, value 
acceptability and public acquiescence, then it is far more likely to rise to the top 
of the policy stream. 
 
The Political Stream 
In order for an issue to rise to the top of the decision agenda, it must not only be 
seen as problem that has a viable solution, but it must also be politically 
expedient for the seasoned politician to tackle. The political stream consists of 
such elements as public mood, election results, changes in administration and 
referendums (Kingdon, 1984, p. 152). 
 Kingdon believes that national mood has a significant bearing on whether 
the issue in question will make it to the decision agenda. While he admits that 
national mood is a hard concept to define, and questions whether it is even 
possible to gauge such a thing, the reality is that those in power do believe they 
can sense what the mood is and do factor it in when making decisions on 
whether or not it is an appropriate time to push for change (Kingdon, 1984, p. 
154). 
 The balance of power regarding organised political forces is another factor 
determining the likelihood of an issue finding its way into the decision agenda. If 
strong forces, such as lobbies or interest groups, are against a solution that has 
risen through the policy stream, it is less likely to hit the decision agenda. As one 
of Kingdon’s interviewees stated, “if too many people get angry, it’s not worth it” 
(Kingdon, 2011, p. 151). Indeed, politicians do not want to expend more political 
capital than is necessary and may wait until political forces are more in favour of 
a solution before they move. 
 Government in the political stream includes changes in administration, 
changes in Congress and appointments to key positions within major 
bureaucracies (Kingdon, 1984, p. 160). For example, with a change in 
administration, the first 100 days is seen as a time when certain solutions will 
gain far greater traction. Questions of jurisdiction play a part in the political 
stream, as some bureaucracies are expected to take a certain stance on an issue, 
and if they take the opposite stance, it can push the issue closer to the top of the 
decision agenda. Kingdon (1984, p. 163) gives the example of airline 
deregulation, when the head of the Civil Aeronautics Board stated that there 
should be less airline regulation, which was effectively introducing the idea that 
he and his bureaucracy wielded too much power. This statement made 
deregulation more politically viable and played a role in deregulation legislation 
being passed. 
When an issue finds itself at the top of all three streams (the problem, 
policy and political streams), it is likely that it will be pushed forward to the 
decision agenda. In applying the policy windows model, the present research 
endeavours to shed some light on what forces pushed marijuana policy reform 
and what forces kept it in check. The following section outlines some of the key 
academic literature relevant to the application of the policy windows model to a 
variety of problems in the U.S. political setting. 
 
A Theory Between Clouds and Clocks 
In choosing a political theory to help explain historical phenomena, it is useful to 
keep the enquiry simple by focusing on why things happened the way they did. 
In this scenario, it is pertinent to know why more liberal feelings/attitudes 
towards marijuana, both in general society and in policy circles, did not result in 
the liberalisation of federal marijuana laws under Ford and Carter.  
 An appropriately chosen theory will help answer this question and will be 
able to shed light on what is likely to happen in the future. When choosing a 
theory to explain the agenda-setting process, formal academic enquiry is very 
much a balancing act between being specific but not omitting factors that affect 
the political realm. This balancing act also demands enquiry that is not overly 
broad, thus leaving no way to make comparisons between issues, political 
systems, or time periods in history. Political scientists Almond and Genco tackled 
this issue by analysing the work of philosopher Karl R. Popper (1965), Of Clouds 
and Clocks: An Approach to the Problem of Rationality and the Freedom of Man, 
and then applying its logic to their discipline. In his central metaphor, Popper 
(1965) identifies precise and predictable systems such as precision clocks, 
motorcars, and pendulums as examples of the “clock” end of the spectrum, while 
he identifies less obviously structured systems such as weather fronts or swarms 
of insects as examples of the less deterministic “cloud” end of the spectrum. 
Human societies fall somewhere between these extremes, but are more likely 
located more towards the cloud end of the spectrum (Almond and Genco, 1977, 
p. 489). In order to understand human behaviour, a model is needed that lands 
somewhere between perfect determinism (clocks) and perfect chance (clouds). 
In their article, “Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics”, Almond and Genco 
(1977) warn of the dangers of creating models that are too similar to other 
scientific disciplines. Indeed, they see that “our longing for full scientific status 
has led us to a kind of “cargo cult” fashioning cardboard imitations of the tools 
and products of the hard sciences in the hope that our incantations would make 
them real” (Almond and Genco, 1977, p. 504). 
In striving to find the ever-elusive independent variable, the political 
science discipline has often forgotten that “memory, learning, goal-seeking, and 
problem solving intervene between cause and effect, between independent and 
dependent variable” (Almond and Genco, 1977, p. 492). Albert Hirschman echoes 
this sentiment in his book, A Bias for Hope, where he calls social scientists to 
remember the “multiplicity and creative disorder of human endeavor” over and 
above stressing regularities and stable relationships (Hirschman, 1971, p. 27). 
Almond and Genco (1977) come to a similar conclusion that trying to understand 
politics through models that are deterministic is inappropriate and that the 
discipline has lost some of its explanatory power in its desire to emulate other 
hard sciences. They assert that “in ‘good’ science methods are fit to the subject 
matter, rather than subject matter being truncated or distorted in order to fit it 
to a preordained notion of ‘scientific’ method” (Almond and Genco, 1977, p. 510). 
Kingdon’s (2011, p. 223) later revision of his work identifies Almond and Genco’s 
application of Popper’s clouds and clocks metaphor as the basis for the policy 
windows model, and he notes that “one of the major recent developments in the 
natural sciences, chaos theory, concentrates on just such fluid processes”. With 
this being the case, the methodological application of policy windows to the 
question of why the era of liberal drug policy under Carter and Ford did not 
result in federal legislative change appears to be more than appropriate.  
Kingdon (2011) did attempt to apply a quantitative methodology to his 
model by looking for measures of agenda status thorough congressional hearings 
and committee reports, presidential messages including state of the union 
addresses, public opinion polls and entries in the New York Times index, but he 
found that “hearings and reports data are not a great deal of help in measuring 
the prominence of an item on the agenda” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 261). A problem 
with using a defined data set, such New York Times articles or state of the union 
addresses is that the full breadth of the policy windows model remains 
untapped. On one hand, it is prudent to avoid a scenario in which information is 
pulled at random from any source. This is certainly not an easy methodological 
issue to solve, yet with an issue as emotionally charged and diverse as drug 
policy, it would seem prudent to err on the side of clouds rather than clocks. For 
example, in the epilogue of the 2011 edition of his book, Kingdon uses his model 
to compare and contrast health care reform under President Clinton with health 
care reform under President Obama, and having taken into account the factors 
identified in each of the three streams, Kingdon does a masterful job of 
explaining why health care reform failed under Clinton, but was likely to succeed 
under Obama. It is this exact application method of Kingdon’s (2011) model that 
I will apply to the question of why marijuana law reforms failed under Ford and 
Carter.  
 
Applications of Policy Windows Theory 
Kingdon (1984) originally developed policy windows theory to explain how 
issues rose to the top of the U.S. federal decision agenda. It has been criticised as 
a theory because it does not take into account international factors that may 
affect U.S. domestic policy (Simon and Aim, 1995, p. 460). This could be of 
concern when attempting to analyse U.S. marijuana policy, as it has strong 
international links and implications. On the other hand, one scholar suggests that 
the U.S. takes little notice of international thought when constructing drug policy 
(Buxton, 2006). Despite these concerns, in their article “Policy Windows and 
Two Level Games”, Simon and Aim (1995) found that policy windows as a theory 
was useful in explaining the passage of acid rain legislation, which also had an 
international component to it (Canadian interests were heavily involved). They 
found that “Kingdon describes the political process in a way that seems to match 
the perceptions of our respondents and any others who work in policy-making” 
(Simon and Aim, 1995, p. 460).  
 The authors also decided that a change in administration was a key 
component in opening up a policy window, in line with Kingdon’s (1984) original 
theory, but suggested that policy windows place too much emphasis on a single 
entrepreneur pushing an issue to the decision agenda, as in the case of acid rain 
legislation (Simon and Aim, 1995). In fact, the problem, policy and political 
streams “were not joined by a single entrepreneur; rather they were joined by 
the combined efforts of many actors in the process” (Simon and Aim, 1995, p. 
466). Another application of Kingdon’s revised (2011) model can be found in the 
article titled, “Pollution, Political Agendas and Policy Windows” (Solecki and 
Shelley, 1996), where it is used to explore the rise of environmental issues to the 
forefront of the federal decision agenda in U.S. politics in the 1950s. Solecki and 
Shelley’s (1996) contention is that while most environmental historians and 
policy analysts believe the environment as an issue became prominent only in 
the 1960s, an application of the policy windows theory shows that it was in the 
late 1950s that the three environmental problem, policy and political streams 
started to gain strength and converge (Solecki and Shelley, 1996, p. 451). This 
successful application of the policy windows framework is particularly pertinent 
to the current research, as it shows that the theory can be successfully applied by 
reference to historical records, as opposed to interviews with policy makers. In 
addition, Solecki and Shelley’s (1996, p. 452) analysis revealed how policy 
windows theory was particularly useful in explaining how New Jersey State 
legislation was instrumental in propelling pollution onto the federal stage. In 
fact, this interaction between state and federal government is also relevant with 
regard to marijuana policy. 
 Furthermore, in explaining the rise of the “three strikes and you’re out” 
legislation, academics use policy windows theory because “it emphasises the 
roles of both creativity and chance in the policy-making process, effects that 
other models attempt to minimise or control”(Saint-Germain and Calamia, 1996, 
p. 59). As drug policy formation is particularly vulnerable to focusing events, a 
theory that allows for creativity and chance in the policy creation process is an 
important tool. 
 Kingdon’s (2011) revised policy windows model was also applied in an 
attempt to explain the passage of the “no child left behind”(NCLB) legislation 
(Jaiani and Whitford, 2011). The researches noted that they did not use the 
policy windows model to explore the efficacy of the policy, but focused instead 
on “the process by which NCLB evolved to become the standard unifying 
framework for American K-12 education” (Jaiani and Whitford, 2011, p. 9). In 
fact, the Jaiani and Whitford (2011) study relies primarily on Government 
Accountability Office(GAO) reports and presidential speeches as opposed to 
interviews with policy makers. In doing so, these scholars have moved beyond 
Kingdon’s original application of the model, a move that sidesteps some of the 
issues associated with retrospective interviews (Jaiani and Whitford, 2011, p. 
15). Indeed, the NCLB legislation was essentially a federalisation of a Texas State 
initiative to improve education state-wide, and the authors of the NCLB analysis, 
with the use of the policy windows model, successfully tracked the emergence of 
an issue from the state to the federal decision agenda (Jaiani and Whitford, 
2011). 
The policy windows model, as evidenced in the sample of its applications 
explored in this section, is primarily used to analyse U.S. domestic policy, yet it is 
also applied successfully in international contexts (Rex and Jackson, 2009; 
Nelson, 2007). However, Kingdon’s (2011) model is criticised for being ill-
defined in certain aspects, such as what constitutes national mood, while other 
political analysts suggest that the whole model is indeterminate and unable to 
give satisfactory answers as to why some problems make it to the decision 
agenda (Mucciaroni, 1992, p. 459). With regard to drug policy, one noted author 
contends that “Kingdon’s formulation is so comprehensive and leaves so much 
room for random elements that a comparative analysis of policy-making 
processes is impossible” (Sharp, 1994, p. 15). While the critiques by Muccarioni 
and Sharp are certainly worth taking note of, their preferred approaches land 
somewhere closer to the hard science (the clock model) end of the spectrum of 
political science, which for reasons already discussed, this research avoids.  
In conclusion, the policy windows framework is a soft science way of 
holistically approaching the political processes or forces that arise when an issue 
rises to prominence, and while it provides a framework with which to 
understand this rise, Kingdon (2011) does not attempt to quantify the weight 
these different forces will exert on the issue. For example, he does not detail an 
exact formula that will predict whether a focusing event in the problem stream 
will overcome organised political forces entrenched in the political stream. The 
strength of the Kingdon (2011) model lies in its ability to map the political 
landscape with regard to a specific issue, allowing any political analyst to 
identify what is likely blocking the issue from making it to the decision agenda, 
and where the issue has decent support. The three streams approach allows for 
good and bad fortune in the political realm, without diminishing the important 
role of the entrepreneur in pushing an issue on to the decision agenda. 
Consequently, the application of the policy windows model to the potential 
reform of federal marijuana legislation seems appropriate in the current 
research.  
  
The Problem Stream During Ford & Carter 
Within any society, there is almost an endless list of problems, yet at any given 
time, only a few will enter the public consciousness. Some problems may stay 
relatively constant over extended periods, while others can rise and fall 
dramatically due to cultural or political shifts. Calling upon the policy windows 
theory, this section explains what forces are at play to elevate a specific problem 
above others in general, and how the theoretical framework applies specifically 
to the issue of marijuana use in the U.S. in the 1970s.  
 Marijuana use grew dramatically during the 1960s and 1970s, and the 
issue gained a great deal of exposure under Nixon, partly because this spike in 
drug use warranted a focused response from the Federal Government, and partly 
because being tough on drugs was a smart political move at the time. As drug use 
continued to climb during the 1970s, the issue of drug use went through a 
problem redefinition. Under Nixon, drug use was an enemy to be eradicated, 
prompting his initiative, the War on Drugs, but under Ford and Carter, a growing 
recognition that widespread drug use was entrenched in mainstream American 
society prevailed. Thus, it would be unwise to institute policies that aimed for a 
drug-free America. Whereas Nixon’s administration defined the problem as the 
use of marijuana per se, a more nuanced approach under Ford and Carter 
regarded marijuana abuse as the problem; in fact, bureaucrats under Ford and 
Carter saw harsh drug laws as equally, if not more harmful, than the smoking of 
cannabis. Draconian drug laws, rather than drug use, were becoming the new 
villains. In order to understand what factors were at play to raise the problem of 
marijuana prohibition within the problem stream during the mid-1970s, I will 
discuss seven broad categories that make up Kingdon’s (2011) problem stream 
in the following section, with specific reference to the problem of marijuana use 
and abuse during the 1970s.  
 
Systematic Indicators 
Relevant systematic indicators, with regard to marijuana use in the U.S., start in 
earnest with a Gallup poll conducted in 1967, which began tracking marijuana 
use rates among university students. In 1972, the Shafer Commission conducted 
a nationwide survey, and in 1975, the annual survey of high school seniors 
began, and continues to the present day. These indicators confirmed that there 
was a marked increase in marijuana use during the 1970s, peaking in 1979, 
when 60.4% of high school seniors reported smoking pot (Harrison et al., 1995, 
p. 182), while 68% of adults between 18 and 25 had smoked it in the same year 
(Slaughter, 1987, p. 424). Marijuana use had made it out of societal fringe 
groups, including Mexican migrant workers and inner-city Black jazz circles, and 
had pervaded the White middle class. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
marijuana use by high school students held a positive correlation with 
subsequent university attendance (Goode, 1970, chapter 2), yet as the 1970s 
continued, it became clear that the so-called expanded consciousness gained 
through the use of mind-altering substances was not the utopia that Timothy 
Leary and his counterparts had envisioned. In fact, as the years rolled by, this 
positive correlation between pot use and university attendance reversed and 
became a negative one. Nixon had waged a War on Drugs and had claimed 
victory in 1972, a claim which was not entirely unwarranted considering the 
success he had had with reducing heroin addiction through harm reduction 
methods, such as the methadone maintenance programme; yet, scholars also 
argued that Nixon manipulated drug use figures in order to make it seem that he 
had had a greater deal of success than was the reality on the ground, something 
that became harder to do the longer drug-use rates were recorded (Robinson 
and Scherlen, 2007).  
These systematic indicators confirmed that the problem of marijuana use 
was increasing dramatically, which according to Kingdon’s (2011) theory, would 
help push the issue to the top of the problem stream, yet under Presidents Ford 
and Carter, the use of marijuana was not seen so much a problem as the laws 
governing it. This move to redefine the problem was a manifestation of the battle 
between two approaches that continues today. The proponents of these two 
approaches disagree as to whether drug abuse should be tackled through a 
criminal justice, or a public health paradigm. This aspect of problem definition is 
discussed later in the problem stream. However, what is unusual about the 
systematic indicators with regard to marijuana use is that the increase was so 
immense and was by a total different class of user (the White middle class); thus, 
these systematic indicators required politicians to change their approach 
entirely (Musto, 2002b, p. 219). The increase in marijuana use initially pushed 
the problem to the top of the problem stream; hence, Nixon’s War on Drugs 
ensued, but as this problem became so overwhelming and infiltrated all sectors 
of society, it morphed in the politicians’ and public’s collective mind from a 
problem to be fixed to a condition to be managed. This change in perception gave 
pragmatic harm reduction approaches greater popularity, which, up until 
recently, was unprecedented in U.S. drug policy history. 
 
Reports Produced in the Problem Stream 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), governmental organisations and 
academics are often commissioned to write reports in order to shed light on the 
extent of a particular problem and to give recommendations as to the best course 
of action. These reports will push an issue up in the problem stream (Kingdon, 
2011, p. 91) to varying degrees, depending on the reputation of the body 
compiling the report and depending on the political environment within which 
the report is released.  
 In 1972, the NCMDA issued a report titled Marihuana, A Signal of 
Misunderstanding. This report (1972) was chaired by Raymond P. Shafer, and 
was referred to after its publication as The Shafer Commission Report. The report 
was released at an unfortunate time, as President Nixon was in full swing with 
his War on Drugs rhetoric in March 1972 (Musto, 2002a, p. 165), and even if the 
President, in private, had agreed with the tenor of the report, which among other 
things, advocated the decriminalisation of marijuana, he would not have been 
able to have publicly accepted its findings. Having been rejected by the Nixon 
Administration, The Shafer Commission Report (1972) lay dormant for a few 
years until a more pragmatic approach to marijuana became more politically 
tenable. Once the view of drug use as an inevitable part of society became more 
popular, this report started to wield a great deal of power, as it had essentially 
come from the heart of an administration that was vehemently anti-drug. If a 
Nixon administration on the warpath against drugs could come up with such 
liberal drug pronouncements, then there really must be something to a harm 
reduction approach. Kingdon (2011) notes that if a governmental department 
makes recommendations that are outside of what it is usually expected, then this 
can give the recommendation greater traction. For example, during President 
Carter’s term, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) recommended deregulating the 
airline industry, a move which limited the size and scope of CAB. This 
unexpected recommendation, made by an organisation that exists to regulate, 
gave greater momentum to the deregulation movement (Kingdon, 2011, p. 11). 
The same factor seems to be at play with regard to The Shafer Commission Report 
(1972) arising out of the Nixon Administration’s War on Drugs. Since the report 
was authored from the political right at a time when the drug war was in full 
swing, was analysts and onlookers assumed that it would mirror Nixon’s public 
view on drugs. The fact that it recommended a harm reductionist approach 
meant that the Shafter Commission report received little attention at the time, 
but became an important weapon for those wishing to decriminalise marijuana 
later in the decade. 
 In 1975, the Ford Administration released The White Paper on Drug Abuse. 
In many ways, this white paper reflected the same views as the Shafer 
Commission’s findings, including that Americans should learn to live with some 
level of substance use, and even abuse (Musto, 2002a, p. 167). The national mood 
in America was shifting away from seeing marijuana as an evil to be eradicated, 
and by 1975, 57% of high school seniors saw regular smoking of marijuana as 
harmless. The White Paper on Drug Abuse (1975) captured this shift in thinking: 
 
For the first time a public presidential document on drug policy 
eschewed absolutist rhetoric, tried to accommodate increasing 
social tolerance of drug consumption, and recognized that the 
‘drug problem’ was not monolithic — that different drugs have 
different effects and pose different risks to their users. (Musto, 
2002a, p. 165) 
 
Specific drugs were being seriously looked at in terms of their different effects, 
as opposed to the traditionally monolithic paradigm in which all drug use was 
morally reprehensible. This shift in attitude made the discussion of a specific 
marijuana policy possible, as one did not have to argue that harder drugs, such as 
heroin, should be legalised, but just that this one, comparatively benign drug, 
should be reconsidered in the legislature. 
 While the content of The White Paper on Drug Abuse (1975) and the 
Shafer Commission publication were both important, they were not the first 
governmental reports to suggest a more harm reductionist approach. It was that 
their publication dates coincided with a peak in academic, social and political 
acceptance of substance use that made the reports harder to ignore and gave 
them more gravitas when they were cited in front of congressional hearings 
calling for the decriminalisation of marijuana. 
 
Focusing Events, Crises and Symbols 
Kingdon (2011, p. 94) notes that systematic indicators and reports are often not 
enough to bump a problem to the top of the stream, but that problems often 
require the accompaniment of some kind of sensational event or symbol that 
acts as a catalyst (Kingdon, 2011, p. 94). Certainly, with regard to the closing of 
the policy window for federal decriminalisation of marijuana, there are 
numerous examples of focusing events that bought an end to an era of liberal 
drug policy, such as the then ‘Drug Czar’, Peter Bourne being accused of using 
cocaine at a NORML party. When looking at the opening of the policy window, 
however, no equally dramatic event can be connected to it. The movement 
towards decriminalisation was more of a slow and begrudging realisation that a 
drug-free America, especially with regard to marijuana, was a fantasy, and that 
more realistic policy goals should be instituted.  
 Kingdon discusses California’s Proposition 13 as an example of a 
legislative symbol, which came to embody the general feeling of the time that 
nationwide, taxpayers were severely resistant to higher taxation and to new, 
expensive government programmes (Kingdon, 2011, p. 97). A similar symbol for 
federal law makers may well have been the spate of states that decriminalised, or 
substantially liberalised, their marijuana laws during the 1970s. Much has been 
written on whether states act as policy entrepreneurs in leading a reluctant 
federal government or vice versa, but for the purpose of applying the theory of 
policy windows to the present discussion, it is enough to say that changes in 
state law contributed in some way to an increasing awareness at the federal level 
that the War on Drugs was losing popularity, and that certain parts of the 
country at least, were ready for a different approach.  
 Under the category of focusing events, Kingdon (2011) also discusses 
personal experience of a policy maker as a factor that can drive the passage of an 
issue to the top of the problem stream. He uses the example of different modes of 
transportation, and describes how airlines have an advantage over busses, as 
those involved in formulating transportation policy rarely ride busses but often 
use aircraft (Kingdon, 2011, p. 97). Certainly, both Presidents Ford and Carter 
were more publicly accepting of their children’s use of marijuana than their 
predecessors would have been. This could be because, in that cultural moment, 
many policy makers were coming to terms with the fact that their middle- and 
upper-class offspring were smoking pot at a historically unprecedented level. It 
may be no coincidence that this liberal era in drug policy coincides with the 
moment when middle-class marijuana use was peaking. 
Attempts to liberalise drug policy will always be vulnerable to focusing 
events, because no matter how solid and well-reasoned, a case for liberalisation 
— if a celebrity dies of a drug overdose or a major drug bust occurs at the crucial 
moment — is a cause that will be derailed. Liberalising drug policy just does not 
seem to have the same emotional force as its conservative counterpart, and no 
matter how coherent the argument for decimalisation is, it will always be 
vulnerable to conservative backlash. 
 
Feedback 
There does seem to be a good deal of overlap between what Kingdon (2011) 
refers to as official indicators and feedback, two categories that make up the 
problem stream. However, monitoring of expenditure, evaluation of 
programmes, specific complaints and new problems that have arisen as a result 
of a programme’s enactment (Kingdon, 2011, p. 100) are all factors that are 
included for discussion in this section. Feedback that helped push marijuana 
prohibition to the top of the policy stream included the mounting cost of the War 
on Drugs, coupled with the simultaneous rise of drug use across all sectors of 
society. Kingdon (2011, p. 102) notes that “another type of information that 
indicates a problem, is a failure to meet stated goals”. An example of a failure to 
meet stated goals, which had unforeseen negative consequences, was the 
implementation of Operation Intercept at the start of Nixon’s War on Drugs. 
Initially, every item crossing the Mexican border into the U.S. was examined in 
order to stop the flow of narcotics. After a couple of weeks, however, the policy 
encountered strong resistance from industry and commercial interests, as lorries 
waited in queues and produce often rotted for days at the border, where traffic 
had been brought to a standstill. Operation Intercept was dramatically scaled 
back and promptly renamed Operation Cooperation in response to a high volume 
of feedback in the form of complaints and unanticipated consequences. Indeed, 
the increasing number of middle-class young people who were finding 
themselves an unwitting part of the rising prison statistics is another example of 
feedback that undermined the War on Drugs approach and pushed the problem 
of marijuana prohibition to the top of the stream.  
 Kingdon (2011, p. 102) also refers to the rising cost of a programme as a 
form of feedback that can help gain legislative attention, noting that “sometimes 
programmes come to be so costly that policy makers rethink future initiatives”. 
In fact, as the emotive high that accompanies declaring war began to subside, the 
reality of the complex and often counter-intuitive nature of the War on Drugs 
came back to haunt the Nixon Administration, and to the public reacted through 
various feedback channels. It was this feedback information that slowly took the 
wind out of the War on Drugs’ sails and opened up the possibility of the drug 
problem being seen in an entirely different light. Attitudes shifted from viewing 
drug use as the culprit to viewing unintelligent drug policy as equally to blame.  
 
Why Problems Fade 
While sometimes problems fade due to political manipulation or due to a loss of 
currency, “we should not lose sight of the fact that government programmes 
sometimes actually do accomplish fair portions of their objectives” (Kingdon, 
2011, p. 103). With regard to drug policy in the post-Nixon War on Drugs era, it 
is hard to argue that the problem lost prominence because of the success of the 
War on Drugs, however. Kingdon (2011) also notes that a problem can fade, not 
because it is solved, but because legislators feel they have dealt with it 
adequately, regardless of how effective the proposed solution actually is 
(Kingdon, 2011, p. 103). While it may have been somewhat misleading for Nixon 
to proclaim he had “won” the War on Drugs, the best course of action seemed to 
be to claim victory and to hope the issue would lose prominence, which it did for 
a good number of years. During this time, the problem of marijuana use morphed 
into the problem of marijuana prohibition. It was really not so much an example 
of a problem fading, but of a problem being redefined as a condition to be 
managed. 
Elaine B. Sharp (1994, p. 16) contends that according to the inside access 
model of agenda setting, it would be far easier to achieve liberal legislative 
changes on drug policy if the issue was kept out of the limelight. This view has 
some legitimacy and could account for why there was far less press coverage of 
the drug problem during the time of liberalisation. Indeed, government 
advocates with more liberal drug policy leanings realised that the best way to 




Budgetary concerns have a sizeable bearing on whether an issue is likely to 
receive legislative attention, but there is almost no proposed initiative that 
would not claim that, in the long run at least, the nation would be better off 
economically if the problem were to be tackled in a certain way. In the 1970s and 
1980s, while liberals bemoaned the amount spent on the drug war and 
incarceration, conservatives, especially under Reagan, pointed to the 
opportunity cost of drug use, claiming that drugged workers were costing the 
nation untold millions of dollars in unproductive hours; thus, the money spent 
on keeping drugs out of the nation and workplace was actually a form of 
investment.  
 Proposals that cost little on their own terms, or that hold promise as 
methods for controlling rising costs, tend to make it higher in the problem 
stream during times of budgetary constraint (Kingdon, 2011, p. 107), and in the 
mid-1970s, the problem of marijuana prohibition ticked both these boxes. Cost 
saving due to fewer resources required by law enforcement, and the possibility 
of new tax revenue, gave marijuana law reform increased impetus. 
 While the national budget does have a great impact on what problems 
make it to the legislative agenda, there are certain issues with such great 
emotional power attached to them that “policy makers simply ignore the budget” 
(Kingdon, 2011, p. 109). Kingdon (2011, p. 109) uses the example of the kidney 
dialysis programme, stating that “politicians found that the moral inequity 
created by having this dramatic life giving therapy available to some but not all 
was simply intolerable”. The programme became incredibly expensive, and the 
advantages did not really justify the expenditure, but it was an issue that had 
captured the emotions of the legislators, and therefore, it was passed by 
Congress. Liberalising drug laws does not occupy the same moral high ground, 
and does not yield the same force of emotion that stricter drug laws can draw on; 
therefore, liberalisation is always vulnerable to a conservative political 
entrepreneur who wants to roll back liberal reforms. Budget constraints can 
push the prohibition of drugs to the top of the problem stream in times of 
economic hardship as an issue to be dealt with by disbanding prohibition efforts, 
but the idea of dealing prohibitionists a blow can equally easily be sunk, thanks 
to the emotional force that the institution of strict drug laws can draw on. 
 
Problem Definition 
Whether an issue gains legislative attention can often hinge on how that issue is 
perceived in the minds of policy makers. Kingdon (2011) asserts that problems 
that either do not have a solution or are seen as problems not fit for government 
intervention are seen as conditions rather than problems. Issues can also switch 
categories, because “conditions become problems when we believe we should do 
something about them” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 109). Kingdon (2011) uses the 
example of poverty, which, if viewed through a liberal lens, will inspire initiatives 
such as the Great Society programmes of the 1960s, whereas if viewed through a 
conservative lens, the issue of poverty will cause legislators to focus more on 
personal responsibility and in reducing red tape that impedes those who wish to 
work hard and succeed. Thus, in the hands of conservatives, the issue of poverty 
prompts little, or no legislative action (Kingdon, 2011, p. 110).  
 In the 1970s, the issue of marijuana use went through a period of 
redefinition. From being seen as a crime to be eradicated to becoming an 
inevitable part of the culture that should be managed rather than removed, this 
sea change in attitude defined the decade. Under Ford, The White Paper on Drug 
Abuse (1975) started to take a more harm reductionist approach; authors began 
using words such as “minimise” as opposed to “eradicate”. Furthermore, they 
stated that “we should stop raising the expectation of total elimination of drug 
abuse from our society” (Baum, 1996, p. 86). President Carter’s midterm strategy 
echoed this sentiment and plainly iterated that drug abuse was entrenched in 
American society. Carter’s midterm strategy also mooted the idea that the U.S. 
Government did not have the capacity to stop illegal drugs from crossing the 
border, but that leaders could “bring together the resources of the Federal 
Government intelligently to protect … society and those who suffer” (Baum, 
1996, p. 96). A factor that may well have helped facilitate this change in approach 
to drug policy was that middle-class youths were being imprisoned for 
possession and personal use of marijuana at a heretofore unprecedented rate, 
and this trend was increasingly being seen as an inappropriate and 
disproportionate response (Musto, 2002a, p. 192). Kingdon (2011) suggests that 
when what is traditionally seen as a condition is redefined as a problem, 
legislative change is more likely to occur. Interestingly, with drug policy in the 
1970s, the issue briefly moved to being viewed as a condition, rather than a 
problem, yet this movement still prompted at least the appearance of legislative 
change. 
 
Problem Stream Conclusion 
Kingdon’s (2011) policy windows theory is a useful tool in exploring the 
question of why the marijuana prohibition problem received legislative and 
media attention during the late 1970s. The systematic indicators of a continuing 
increase in marijuana use, especially by the White middle and upper classes, 
coupled with two influential governmental releases in The Shafer Commission 
Report (1972) and The White Paper on Drug Abuse (1975), further called into 
question the efficacy of Nixon’s War on Drugs, especially when applied to a drug 
as comparatively benign as marijuana. The fact that 10 states decriminalised the 
drug, and that legislators’ and policy entrepreneurs’ own offspring started 
smoking it, helped signal to the government that a hard-line stance on drugs was 
politically untenable in the future. As Nixon’s drug war ground on, the feedback 
received from people on the ground dealing with the fallout from these 
initiatives was less than promising, and as policy makers came to terms with the 
complexity and seemingly counter-intuitive nature of drug policy, the optimistic 
goal of a drug-free America was replaced with a more pragmatic view. The huge 
costs associated with running a drug war also had an impact on its popularity, 
although all administrations after Carter’s were able to overcome this by using 
the emotional pull of being tough on drug dealers and keeping drugs away from 
kids, no matter what the cost.  
 Kingdon (2011) predicts a rise in the problem stream when an issue that 
was previously framed as a condition is reframed as a problem, but what is 
interesting in this case is that marijuana use went from being seen as a problem 
to be eradicated, to a condition to be managed. This move in the opposite 
direction still pushed the problem upward in the stream. The theory of policy 
windows does not seem to allow for this anomaly, and further case studies are 




The Policy Stream 
The idea of dealing with drug abuse through a public health, as opposed 
to a criminal justice lens, was not new amongst specialists in Carters policy 
stream, but after Nixon’s war on drugs wound up, and President Ford was trying 
to distance himself from his predecessor Nixon’s signature policies, those in the 
policy stream who advocated an alternative to the drug war found themselves 
with an opportunity to broadcast their ideas more widely. However, the law 
enforcement community was more fragmented than usual due to having no 
central Anslinger-like figure to rally around, as well as the infighting that 
occurred between Customs and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) as a result 
of the implementation of Reorganization Plan No. 2 1973. At the same time, those 
advocating more harm reduction approaches and decriminalisation of marijuana 
were in a period of unparalleled political legitimacy, as the War on Drugs was 
seen as a failure, and lobby groups such as the National Organization for the 
Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), led by the talented political entrepreneur 
Keith Stroup, were taken as serious players.  
Political analyst Kingdon (2011) identifies a number of categories in the 
policy stream, such as technical feasibility, anticipation of future constraints and 
value acceptability that require those advocating a new policy, such as 
decriminalisation of marijuana, to be able to give a reasonable idea of what the 
impact of the new policy will be. With respect to decriminalisation, these 
categories are typically hard to satisfy as, especially in the 1970s, no one was 
really sure of what would happen if such liberal drug policies were instituted in a 
modern nation. Even if one was open to decriminalisation in principle, the 
logistics of how the process would work, and the legal contradictions inherent in 
such a move, could still prevent the realisation of liberalised drug laws. However, 
the Shafer Commission (1972) publication, Drug Use in America: Problem in 
Perspective, and the White Paper, alongside the appointment of the most liberal 
‘Drug Czar’ (Peter Bourne, special assistant to the President for health issues and 
Director of the Office of Drug Abuse Policy [ODAP], 1976–1979) in American 
political history, did mean that decriminalisation of marijuana rose to the top of 
the policy stream as a viable alternative during the Carter Administration (1977–
1981). 
Policy Communities 
 Specialists who have a common area of concern form policy communities, 
which, irrespective of the political or social climate, are constantly working 
within their sphere of expertise. New and innovative strategies may be 
conceptualised within these communities for decades before the problem they 
are dealing with gains recognition over and above other issues in the problem 
stream. To be sure, these policy communities are affected by changes in political 
and cultural environments, but “the forces that drive the political stream and the 
forces that drive the policy stream are quite different: each has life of its own, 
independent of the other”(Kingdon, 2011, p. 117). Specialists can work within or 
outside of government, but what defines a specialist group of people as a policy 
community is their concern with one particular area of governmental policy 
(Kingdon, 2011, p. 117).  
Drug policy is always caught in a tug-of-war between the two 
communities of law enforcement on the one hand, and the health community on 
the other. Within these two communities, there is still a great deal of 
fragmentation, but it does not seem appropriate to deal with the health–law 
enforcement divide as a fragmentation as such, because these two policy 
communities use such widely different tools (treatment versus military 
intervention, respectively). Consequently, for the purpose of understanding how 
the policy windows theory applies specifically to drug policy, I will examine the 
harm reduction community as a separate entity to the criminal justice 
community. Kingdon (2011) does not allow for this separation in his theory, but 
for the purposes of the current analysis, this departure from Kingdon’s theory 
appears to be the best approach. 
On the far left of the health approach to drug policy, drug use is seen as a 
net good, with some bad side effects. It is viewed similarly to sports, in that 
participation is seen to boost overall well-being in the population, and even 
though there are some unfortunate injuries, drug use is viewed as an overall net 
positive for society. Drugs boost creativity, bond communities and enhance 
empathy between humans and between humans and nature. While there are 
some negatives due to drug abuse, policy makers advocating the health approach 
believe that overall, the population is better off with free access to mind-altering 
substances. In stark contrast, some far-right proponents of the health approach 
hold the view that drugs are all bad, all the time, and that society would be better 
off with no mind-altering substances at all. However, these more conservative 
practitioners see the attempt at aiming for a ‘drug free’ society as naïve and 
incredibly harmful when such an idea finds its expression in public policy. This 
part of the policy community subscribes to the idea that drug laws should not do 
more harm than the drugs themselves. These two disparate approaches come 
from vastly different starting points, yet allow health approach policy makers to 
agree on a best course of action. 
Those policy makers approaching drug use from a criminal justice 
perspective have no one in their camp who sees drug use as a positive thing for 
society. There are different views held on just how far one should go in pursuing 
and punishing drug users and sellers, but within the criminal justice community, 
as opposed to the health approach policy community, the level of fragmentation, 
and more importantly, the mix of pro- and anti-drug use perspectives, does not 
exist. All criminal justice policy makers are all anti-drug, and this unity adds 
coherence to the anti-drug argument.  
 
Fragmentation of Policy Communities 
During the mid- to late 1970s, the pro-legalisation movement was led by a more 
politically savvy entrepreneur than it had ever had before or since, in the name 
of Keith Stroup, who was the head of NORML during a time when there was very 
little stigma attached to the organisation(Baum, 1996, p. 94). The National 
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws had a much greater air of 
legitimacy during this period, and was taken seriously as an in-touch and 
informed lobby group(Musto, 2002a, p. 193), even being invited to speak to 
Congress on proposals to decriminalise marijuana federally.  
 While NORML and the pro-liberalisation community was at the peak of its 
power, the community advocating a criminal justice approach was far more 
fragmented than usual and lacked an Anslinger-like leader to quieten general 
infighting and to bring about a united front. This infighting manifested itself in an 
especially intense manner between the newly formed DEA and Customs, with 
emphasis on the scope and purview of each agency regarding drug interdiction, 
especially that of gathering and sharing of information pertaining to source 
countries. “The relationship between DEA and Customs rarely functioned 
without hitches, but neither did it reach the depths of animosity and dangerous 
rivalry that existed before 1975”(Musto, 2002a, p. 152). Given that the height of 
conflict between two key agencies that operated from a criminal justice 
paradigm coincided with a period of unparalleled legitimacy and unity for 
legalisation advocacy groups illustrates how fragmentation within a policy 
community can affect its ability to wield political power. 
 
Incentives and Policy Entrepreneurs 
Policy entrepreneurs can be found both within and outside of government, and 
much like their business counterparts, their defining characteristic “is their 
willingness to invest their resources — time, energy, reputation, and sometimes 
money — in the hope of future return”(Kingdon, 2011, p. 122). What constitutes 
a ‘return’ varies, depending on the entrepreneur. Some returns are as basic as 
financial reward, while some entrepreneurs are in the game simply for the thrill 
of being involved in the political process, while others advocate in order to 
defend a certain moral position or to defend their bureaucratic turf (Kingdon, 
2011, p. 123).   
 In drug policy circles in the 1970s, a number of entrepreneurs operated 
both outside and inside of government, but in this section, I will focus on the 
main player outside of government. Those within government will be discussed 
in the “Political Streams” section. What is unusual about this period of liberal 
drug policy is that while those advocating a criminal justice approach to drug use 
did not have a strong central figure to rally around, or to quell dissent, those 
advocating a more liberal approach were able to rally around the politically 
savvy lobby group NORML, led by Keith Stroup. As the 1970 founder of NORML, 
Stroup showed himself to be an effective political operative, and he managed to 
bring together people from vastly different ideological perspectives to advocate 
for decriminalisation of marijuana.  
 Hugh Hefner’s Playboy Foundation was a big part of NORML’s financial 
support, and politically, Hefner brought allies in the form of former deputy 
administrator of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, John Finlator, as 
well as former Attorney General, Ramsey Clark. Stroup also worked closely with 
the head of the Drug Abuse Council, Thomas Bryant (Musto, 2002a, p. 193), and 
for most of Drug Czar Peter Bourne’s tenure (1976–1979) as Director of ODAP, 
Bryant and Stroup agreed on policy and direction. Possibly the greatest coup for 
Stroup occurred in 1974, when President Nixon’s former Drug Czar and the 
architect of the War on Drugs, Dr. Robert DuPont, was the keynote speaker at 
NORML’s annual conference (Baum, 1996, p. 87).  
 Not only was Stroup active at the federal level, but he was also involved in 
changing state laws during the mid-1970s; as he crisscrossed the country urging 
state legislatures to reform their marijuana laws, he gained influence with local 
politicians throughout America (Baum, 1996, p. 80). Since the mid-1970s, 
NORML has lost its political standing, but at the apex of its power, the 
organisation gained new heights when representatives testified before Congress 
about why marijuana laws should be reformed.  
 During the mid-1970s, there were numerous other pro-legalisation lobby 
groups, who also helped push the movement along, but the leaders of these 
organisations did not have Stroup’s entrepreneurial ability. The fact that his rise 
occurred while the prohibitionists were divided and smarting from a failed War 
on Drugs seems to be a major contributing factor to the opening of the policy 




The ideas of economists and political philosophers … are more 
powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled 
by little else … I am sure that the power of vested interests is 
vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of 
ideas. (Maynard, 1936, p. 383) 
 
Political scientists have a tendency to focus on lobby groups, advocates’ ulterior 
motives, smokescreens and the cloak-and-dagger nature of politics. However, as 
illustrated by the above quote, in the long run at least, ideas do play a major role. 
Part of the reason marijuana law reforms hit the agenda is because there really 
were better, more logical alternatives to the War on Drugs. While merit is not the 
only factor that can push a particular proposal to the top of the policy stream, all 
other things being equal, a more effective solution has a greater likelihood of 
making it to the top of politicians’ lists. “Superior argumentation does not always 
carry the day to be sure. But in our preoccupation with power and influence, 
political scientists sometimes neglect the importance of content” (Kingdon, 2011, 
p. 127). Indeed, Carter and Bourne attempted to take the emotion out of drug 
policy, and this effort allowed more intelligent and nuanced solutions to start to 
rise to the top of the policy stream, simply because they were good ideas.  
 
Softening Up Processes 
Within the policy stream, Kingdon identifies a process of ‘softening up’, whereby 
a new idea, which may be the best solution to the problem at hand — if not 
familiar to the policy community, the legislators or the public — is less likely to 
be taken seriously. Policy communities are more resistant to softening up 
approaches (Kingdon, 2011, p. 128), as they tend to be more entrenched in what 
they see as solutions to problems with which they have intimate knowledge. The 
public and the legislators, on the other hand, are less specialised, and therefore, 
tend to have less exposure to the myriad potential solutions to a specific 
problem. This gives entrepreneurs a greater ability to sway these groups. 
 
Bureaucrats and analysts constantly issue studies, reports and 
other papers, some mandated by stature and some done on their 
own; these can play a part in preparing the policy community for 
some future direction, even though no immediate result is evident. 
(Kingdon, 2011, p. 129) 
 
The likes of the white paper, the Marijuana Commission and hearings held before 
Congress in 1975 and 1977 (Slaughter, 1987, p. 425), as well as those in 1978 
(Sharp, 1992, p. 524), had a softening effect on policy communities that were 
already leaning gradually towards a public health approach to marijuana. 
Kingdon (2011, p. 130) uses the example of transportation deregulation, which 
took years of softening up before the first wave of airline deregulation was 
passed, and this example has far less emotional clout than drug policy. Softening 
up is a necessary part of the process when pushing for legislative change, and it 
seems that while there was much greater receptivity to liberal drug policy under 
Ford and Carter, the evidence of this probably belongs in the category of 
softening up rather than it being seen as a genuine policy window.  
 Indeed, these policy initiatives had the opposite effect on communities 
championing a return to the War on Drugs. Dan Baum (1996) writes extensively 
on the how the benign language the Carter Administration used to discuss the 
harm marijuana caused was a factor in mobilising the Parent Movement against 
liberal ‘pot’ laws. The point here is that moves to soften one policy community 
may be the rally point for an opposing community to mobilise. 
 
Technical Feasibility 
Before a policy can, so to speak, ‘float to the top’ of the policy primeval soup, 
there has to be a belief that it will work as a solution to the current problem. It is 
not enough for an idea to seem right, or for it to be the morally correct path. 
“Many a good idea is sent back to the drawing board, not because it isn’t a good 
idea, but because it isn’t ‘ready’ or ‘all worked out’” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 131). 
Technical feasibility is a particularly hard category to be satisfied in drug policy 
circles, because the ‘soft’ data that come from black markets regarding drug use 
rates, prices and harm of different substances, and almost all forms of hard data, 
can differ drastically.  
 No modern nation had experimented with such liberal drug laws when 
Carter was President in the late 1970s, so there was even more guess work than 
exists today about what the effects of decriminalising marijuana would be. While 
there are many problems caused by the prohibition of marijuana, as a policy, it 
appears coherent. Decriminalising marijuana potentially creates an environment 
in which the law is essentially unenforced, and this can have a negative impact 
on the justice system as a whole.  
 If decriminalisation is seen as sending mixed messages, and out-and-out 
legalisation brings a whole host of unknown impacts, then the status quo tends 
to hold. It is essentially a ‘better the devil you know’ scenario. Questions about 
how a legalised marijuana market might work, such as how to prevent another 
‘big tobacco’ lobby from taking a heavy political and social toll, arise. Another 
equally pertinent and difficult question centres around how to ensure that youth 
drug use rates do not skyrocket. For more mature users, the thorny question of 
how to deal with a potentially greater number of stoned people in the workforce 
becomes a health and safety/productivity issue with serious ramifications. All of 
these conundrums must pass the test of technical feasibility and must be allowed 
to rise in the policy stream before legalisation can occur. It could well be that 
prohibition of marijuana is the proverbial ‘frying pan’, but legalisation or 
decriminalisation is the ‘fire’.  
 
Value Acceptability 
Within the community of specialists in the drug use policy field, there tends to be 
a similar paradigm lens through which the majority view the various problems 
and solutions that are in their field (Kingdon, 2011, p. 133). A solution that does 
not line up with the values of a sizeable portion of the policy community will 
likely not rise in the policy stream, because they are not acceptable according to 
analysts’ personal moral values.  
Kingdon (2011, p. 133) discusses other issues that tend to crop up in the 
value acceptability category, such as the perceived unique political environment 
in the U.S., which allows politicians to place a far greater emphasis on the ability 
of free enterprise and the inability of government than do political counterparts 
in other less intensely capitalistic countries in the developed world. In saying 
this, the portion of Kingdon’s (2011) theory that resonates most with drug policy 
discussion in this section relates to the fact that policy makers are swayed by 
emotion. Kingdon (2011) uses the example of the renal dialyses programme, 
which was originally unfunded under Medicare; it became apparent that only a 
few well-to-do people had access to this very necessary life-saving treatment. 
The media began to run stories of so called “death committees” in which 
physicians would look through files and decide who should and who should not 
be saved by the new treatment. Of course, the health community routinely makes 
these kinds of decisions; yet, “such a fundamental, dramatic difference of 
treatment was more than decision makers values could bare”(Kingdon, 2011, p. 
136). The House and Senate quickly passed bills that allowed renal dialysis and 
kidney transplants to be financed by Medicare, and in a few years, the costs of 
this amendment had passed the billion-dollar mark. From a utilitarian 
perspective, the money could have been better spent in other areas to save and 
prolong more lives, but in a less obvious way. “The moral pressure to avoid 
letting people die, when a procedure was available to save them, but for its cost, 
was simply irresistible”(Kingdon, 2011, p. 136).  
While it can be easy to slip into the false dichotomy of emotional versus 
purely rational decision making in academic writing, it does seem that drug 
policy under the Ford and Carter Administrations was at its most pragmatic. The 
year of 1978 is generally perceived by historians as the high water mark for 
liberal drug policy thinking, both societally and within government (Baum, 1996, 
p. 97; Musto, 2002, p. xxi), but as the Parent Movement against liberal drug 
policy started to gain momentum, proponents managed to swing key figures 
within policy circles, such as Dr. Robert DuPont, to change their tune on liberal 
drug policies based on the hypothetical prospect of a falling age of addiction. In 
policy circles, those calling for liberal reforms then found themselves isolated as 
lone voices calling in the wilderness of anti-drug sentiments, and the Parent 
Movement gained more momentum. This state of affairs was partly due to the 
fact that the political landscape was changing rapidly as the Reagan era 
approached. The emotional imperative of keeping drugs out of the hands of 
children was a force far greater than the formation of a coherent and fair drug 
policy, which, overall, worked to minimise the harm that addictive substances 
have on society. 
 
Anticipation of Future Constraints 
Anticipation of future constraints is a hurdle that is very hard to cross when 
attempting to liberalise drug policy. Policy makers and politicians must deal with 
a lot of unknowns when looking to espouse options outside of the supply-side 
prohibitionist paradigm. Certainly, when Carter was in office and even in the 
present day, there has been no modern nation that has substantially relaxed 
their drug laws for long enough to be able to answer the question of what would 
happen to a society if extremely powerful drugs were readily available to the 
public. “Down the line, decision makers need to be convinced that … there is a 
reasonable chance that politicians will approve, and that the public in its various 
facets — both mass and activist — will acquiesce”(Kingdon, 2011, p. 138). It is 
likely that those in Carter’s Administration, such as Robert DuPont and Stuart 
Eizenstat, who urged more caution in advocating for the decriminalisation of 
marijuana, may have been looking at possible future constraints imposed by 
societal values. Indeed, while under the Carter regime, the majority of Americans 
did approve of decriminalising marijuana.  
In the political balancing act that prevails in all nations, policy makers 
must also take into account the small, but powerful activist sections of the 
population, such as the Parent Movement, that may become active in the face of 
new policy announcements. The anticipation of mass public approval for 
liberalisation, may have been misread in this instance, as it could very well have 
been public disillusionment with the government’s ability to effectively deal with 
the problem that set the pre-announcement political scene of acceptance. In sum 
total, America’s long history of drug prohibition meant that it was hard to 
conceive of a society that allowed easy access to marijuana. Even those in the 
policy stream, tasked with formulating solutions to problems, take notice of what 
is occurring politically and are not going to put their efforts into advocating 
policies that they see as bound to fail. Certainly, under both Ford and Carter, the 
anticipation of future constraints on a bill to decriminalise marijuana were lower 
than at any other time since, but the combination of the unknown and 
unknowable (when dealing with data from black markets), as well as activist 
segments of the population, meant that federal decriminalisation of marijuana 
probably did not meet the criteria for gaining wholesale backing from the policy 
communities involved. 
 
The Emerging Consensus: Bandwagoning and Tipping 
Within the policy community, certain ideas will, for a variety of reasons, gain 
traction and start to build momentum as more policy makers ‘jump on the 
bandwagon’. These ideas tend not to be brand new, but are a recombination of 
other solutions, with a tweak or two. In his interviews, Kingdon (2011. p. 140) 
found that those in the policy stream would refer to an “increased feeling” or a 
“growing realization” and that this sort of rhetoric signalled that some kind of 
tipping point was being reached in their thinking and in society in general. 
Unusually, but quite aptly, Kingdon compares this process of growing consensus 
among policy specialists to that of pending changes in racially mixed 
neighbourhoods. This tipping point model, based on Thomas Schelling’s ideas, 
revealed that in previously all-White neighbourhoods, one or two non-White 
minority families would move in, and that this changed the social landscape very 
little. Thus, the racial mix altered only slowly at first, but once a certain number 
of minority families settled in the neighbourhood, a tipping point was reached, 
and “White flight” took place very rapidly after that point (Kingdon, 2011, p. 
140). 
Looking at drug policy through a criminal justice lens has been the 
predominant social and political narrative in modern U.S. political history, yet 
there have always been voices calling for a more compassionate, or libertarian 
approach to drug policy. For the most part, they have been ignored, but for a 
period of time in the wake of a population jaded by Nixon and his War on Drugs, 
when Ford and Carter presided over a policy stream where these voices started 
to become predominant. Indeed, academic journals from this time have an air of 
inevitability to them when discussing the liberalisation of drug laws. The feeling 
that the War on Drugs had failed, that finally the American legislature had 
learned that prohibition was not the best path, and that substance use and abuse 
will always be with us, was becoming the dominant narrative. 
 
The Importance of the Available Alternative 
Possibly one of the most powerful barriers to meaningful drug law reform has 
been the lack of a viable alternative. Kingdon (2011, p. 142) distinguishes 
between those issues that make it to the more broad governmental agenda and 
those that make it to the more specific decision agenda. It is rare for a problem to 
make it to the decision agenda if it does not have a well-reasoned solution 
attached to it. These issues may be major societal problems, but float in the 
governmental agenda for decades, in large part because a viable and coherent 
solution has not been tabled. “It is not enough that there is a problem, even quite 
a pressing problem. There also is generally a solution ready to go, already 
softened up, already worked out”(Kingdon, 2011, p. 142). As already discussed 
in this section, the fact that so little was known about the impact of liberalising 
drug laws meant that those operating in the political realm in the late 1970s 
would be taking quite a gamble that their policy people were right. 
 
Policy Stream Conclusion 
The issue of drug abuse is dealt with by two distinctly different communities in 
the U.S., the law enforcement community and the health community. After 
Reorganization Plan No. 2 was instituted, the level of infighting within the law 
enforcement community was at an all-time high, as Customs and the DEA 
disagreed on jurisdictional boundaries. This mixed law enforcement community 
also suffered from not having a strong central figure to rally around and to quell 
internal dissent, such as the powerfully dominant Anslinger, who had so 
effectively played this role for decades before the 1970s, when he ran the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN).  
 The harm reduction community, on the other hand, was enjoying a period 
of unparalleled political legitimacy, as it was not seen as political suicide to 
advocate for more lenient drug laws. The extremely effective entrepreneur Keith 
Stroup was able to foster alliances with other powerful figures such as Hugh 
Hefner, Dr. Robert DuPont and Peter Bourne. Those working in the policy stream 
were emboldened to espouse more liberal views on drug policy, as President 
Carter was advocating for decriminalisation of marijuana. Kingdon (2011) also 
makes the point that political scientists tend to get preoccupied with the impact 
that special interest groups and political manoeuvrings can have when it comes 
to forming policy, and can forget that some legislation is passed because it solves 
the problem and is legitimately a good idea. It would seem that during the mid- 
to late 1970s there was less anti-drug vitriol being used to score political points, 
and that this relaxation allowed for more innovative and rational solutions to the 
drug problem to be considered.  
 While there were societal factors pushing the solution of federal 
decriminalisation of marijuana to the top of the policy stream, there were also a 
number of unknowns that kept it from gaining enough momentum to find its way 
into legislation. Much of this inertia came from the fact that very little was known 
about what the ramifications of substantially liberalising drug laws would be. It 
is very hard to say with certainty what the implications of a change in drug law 
will be, in part because of the lack of certainty about how accurate estimations 
regarding a black market can be.  
 While Kingdon (2011) stresses the separation of the political and policy 
streams in his theory, there is still a good deal of overlap, and those in the policy 
stream who are tasked with searching for solutions are well aware of what is 
politically and socially acceptable. This issue of value acceptability makes the 
possibility of wholesale legalisation of drugs unlikely in most societies, but in the 
mid-1970s, societal values concerning drugs looked very much like they would 
accommodate the decriminalisation of marijuana. The problem of drug use had 
risen to the top of the problem stream, and it seems that decriminalisation of 
marijuana as part of the solution to that problem had also risen to the top of the 
policy stream. What is less clear is whether this solution could rise as a viable 
option in the political stream. 
  
The Political Stream 
Within the problem stream, issues that become increasingly pressing will rise to 
the top of agendas through a number of different mechanisms, and in the policy 
stream, solutions to these problems are constructed; while thought is given to 
the political practicality of solutions, there is a greater sense of objectivity to 
finding the best solution to the problem than in the political stream. The political 
stream takes into account the realities of opposition parties and the separation 
of power. At times, it forces advocates of solutions to refrain from pushing for 




A large part of the political stream comes under the rather amorphous heading of 
‘national mood’. This concept is often referred to in other ways, such as ‘the 
climate of the country’, a ‘shift to the left or right’ or an ‘anti-government feeling’ 
(Kingdon, 2011, p. 147). Kingdon (2011) does not dodge the problems 
associated with such an ill-defined category, going so far as to question whether 
such a mood is even a reality. Aside from the methodological issues this could 
create, he states, “people in and around government believe quite firmly that 
something like a national mood has important policy consequences” (Kingdon, 
2011, p. 149). 
National mood is shaped as elected officials get a sense from their 
constituents as to what issues are important and subsequently communicate 
these views to bureaucrats, who then spend their time working on the 
pinpointed issues. The stories the media chooses to run also have an effect 
(Kingdon, 2011, p. 149). The drop in media coverage of drug issues under the 
Carter Administration took the emphasis away of drug policy in favour of 
economic issues and issues of national security. This allowed some breathing 
space for those who advocated a demand-side strategy to work on a more 
holistic plan. Policy publications, such as the Shafer Commission’s report, Drug 
Use in America: Problem in Perspective, which came out in 1972 under Nixon and 
received little attention due to it not being anti-drug enough for the then 
President, were given greater credibility under subsequent Presidents Ford and 
Carter, as the War on Drugs was starting to yield evidence of substantial 
collateral damage. As already mentioned, the white paper and the Shafer 
Commission both emphasised how benign marijuana was in comparison to other 
drugs, even alcohol, and this nuance did much to quell prohibitionists’ 
arguments. During the mid-1970s, news stories about drugs and drug-related 
events and incidents dropped dramatically (Sharp, 1994, p. 15), with media 
outlets such as the New York Times and Time Magazine stating that it looked as 
though it was only a matter of time before the Federal Government caught up 
and decriminalised marijuana (Baum, 1996, pp. 80, 87). According to Ford and 
Carter’s drug policy expert, David Musto, “among the citizenry, toleration 
towards the so called recreational use of some drugs was becoming more 
common and more than a few Americans actively and openly advocated drug 
use”(Musto, 2002, p. xix). 
The fact that a growing number of drug users were of a White middle-
class background, were college students or were returning Vietnam veterans, 
meant that the method of tying an ethnic minority to a substance, such as the 
identification of opium use with the Chinese minority at the turn of the Century, 
or the link politicians made between marijuana use and a surplus Mexican labour 
market in the 1930s, was therefore less of an option. The mainstream middle 
class’s best and brightest were smoking pot at hitherto unprecedented levels, 
and a war-weary nation found it easier to let the tide turn in favour of 
practicality rather than to wage a war on the ones who had been half a world 
away waging a war on American’s behalf. The national mood shifted to the left, 
as evidenced by media accounts of the time, partly through the lack of any 
hardline anti-drug national address given by Ford or Carter, who, rather than 
vehemently condemning marijuana use in their presidential debates, allowed 
their speeches to “[take] the form of a competition between the candidates as to 
who would be more understanding of his children’s experimentation with 
marijuana” (Musto, 2002, p. xix).  
National mood had shifted for the first time since Anslinger took the helm, 
and American society in general was leaning towards being more 
accommodating of drug use; the politicians were starting to be affected by what 
they sensed as a change. Kingdon (2011) does not allow for this socially driven 
political motivation in his conception of national mood, but it seems clear that 
historical feelings towards an issue would play a part in the construction of 
national mood, which is likely affected by the legacy of prohibitionist ideology. 
While a majority of Americans supported decriminalisation, an equal majority 
still believed the use of the drugs to be physically harmful (Sharp, 1994, p. 41). 
Thus, the period of receptivity to liberal drug policy, which occurred between 
1972 and 1978, was, in historical context, a minor blip in national mood from the 
prevailing consensus that was put into place by Anslinger in the 1930s. Rather 
than being seen as a shift towards more wholehearted, widespread acceptance of 
drug use, this period in the 1970s could be seen as a time when the American 
people were less optimistic. Still smarting from the Vietnam War, Watergate and 
the continuing Iranians hostage fiascos, a sense of resignation had set in. Indeed, 
President Reagan pinpointed this mood when he took office and famously 
boasted of taking down the surrender flag and running up the battle flag against 
drugs once more. 
 
Organised Political Forces 
Kingdon (2011) discusses how policy entrepreneurs and policy communities 
interact with government in his analysis of organised political forces. In his 
policy stream discussion, centred around policy communities, Kingdon (2011) 
looks for reasons why the liberalisation side gained more traction in the 1970s, 
while the prohibitionist side was more fragmented. It is evident from his 
discussion that the perceived strength or weakness of a lobby group can have a 
significant effect on the political stream, as politicians weigh up what level of 
support or opposition there is for any and all political moves they may make, and 
then act accordingly (Kingdon, 2011). Quantifying the balance of political 
support has similar methodological issues associated with quantifying national 
mood, but Kingdon (2011, p. 151) insists that the key factor is that those in 
government “can be quite specific about who is on which side and which side has 
greater strength, however they define that strength”. 
 Those wishing to continue the Nixon-style drug war were dealt a big blow 
when Ford took over and actively distanced himself from initiatives that were 
closely linked to Nixon himself (Musto, 2002b, p. 140), but the marijuana 
prohibitionist model was not brought into question within government until the 
election of Carter, when those on the pro-decriminalisation side of the argument 
found sympathetic ears under the new administration. Drug experts who 
espoused more liberal approaches felt freer to express their own opinions after 
Nixon departed (Musto, 1999b, p. 258).  
While the pro-decriminalisation organised political forces such as NORML 
had a listening ear during the Carter Administration, they did not foresee the tide 
shifting and the Parent Movement become a part of what was a conservative 
shift across the country. “Just as the formation of NORML had reflected a mood 
for a more open drug policy, now the birth of PRIDE (Parents’ Resource Institute 
for Drug Education) indicated the presence of a constituency that wanted 
harsher drug laws” (Levinson, 2002, p. 25). An interesting example of the power 
that organised political forces can apply is that of Dr. Robert L. DuPont, Director 
of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), who became an advocate of 
marijuana decriminalisation during the mid-1970s until the Parent Movement 
gained momentum, when he went back to advocating prohibition. When 
questioned on why he changed his stance, he said that “it was parent power that 
changed my mind on marijuana” (Musto, 2002b, p. 233). As already discussed in 
the “Policy Streams” section, the battle between Customs and the DEA on the 
supply side, coupled with the unprecedented strength of societal demand and 
legalisation side, meant that politicians believed advocating for decriminalisation 
to be a “politically safe position” (Goldstein, 1977, p. 14). 
 
Turnover of Key Personnel 
In the political stream, turnover of key personnel has an impact on what issues 
will gain the limelight. “Either incumbents in positions of authority change their 
priorities and push new agenda items; or the personnel in those positions 
changes, bringing new priorities onto the agenda by virtue of the 
turnover”(Kingdon, 2011, p. 153). During the mid-1970s, the entire Federal Drug 
Program followed the Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, as it was deemed there 
was “no overall direction below the level of the Attorney 
General”(Reorganization Plan No. 2, 1973). During this time of reorganisation, 
Dr. Robert DuPont was head of both NIDA and the Special Action Office for Drug 
Abuse Prevention (SAODAP), and the fact that he had changed his stance on 
marijuana to the point of supporting decriminalisation, made liberal marijuana 
policies more politically acceptable during this time. While DuPont was certainly 
a key figure during this brief liberal window, the move away from Nixon’s War 
on Drugs by Ford, and the subsequent change of administrations when Carter 
was elected, had greater impact. In the drug policy and political theatre, the most 
influential change in personnel is most likely to be the appointment of Peter 
Bourne as Drug Czar, or more formally, the Director of the National Drug Control 
Policy. Ford, Carter and Bourne’s profound effects on the American political 
stream are discussed in the following subsections. 
 
President Ford  
Apart from it being politically expedient for Ford to distance himself from 
initiatives that were particularly Nixonian after the ex-President’s embarrassing 
impeachment, Ford’s approach to drug politics was quite different. He termed his 
approach to government as the “new realism” and shied away from such 
ambitious sentiments as ending all drug use in America (Musto, 2002a, p. xix). 
His approach was in line with the national mood of the time, which had very little 
positive expectation for government intervention.  
 Ford did not go to the extent of Carter in advocating for the 
decriminalisation of marijuana, however, but even the step back that he took 
from Nixon’s policies in fighting the drug war had negative political 
consequences in the lead-up to his run against his Presidential challenger, Carter. 
Ford’s statements on the limited effectiveness the Federal Government could 
have on the narcotics problem did not help his cause in Congress, and when he 
did not seek appropriations for the funding of the new Office of Drug Abuse 
Policy (ODAP), accusations that he was soft on drugs became a political liability. 
This prompted his statement to supply countries as well as to domestic 
politicians assuring them of his “full commitment to curbing the illicit traffic in 
drugs” including his “pledge to the American people [of] an all-out federal effort 
to combat the drug menace”(Musto, 2002a, p. 175). While Ford did not go as far 
as Carter in terms of advocating a more liberal drug policy, his more pragmatic 
and realistic approach to drug policy did allow for those on the harm reduction 
and demand side of the drug issue to gain more power in policy and political 
circles. Ford was an important step along the road to the even more pragmatic 
Carter. The chasm created by the American journey from Nixon’s drug war to 
Carter’s call for decriminalisation of marijuana was substantially narrowed by 
Ford’s short stint of “new realism”. 
 
President Carter 
In a similar vein to Ford, Carter believed the Federal Government could be of 
limited effectiveness in an all-out war on drugs. His midterm strategy was based 
on the belief that “we cannot talk in absolutes — that drug abuse will cease, that 
no more illegal drugs will cross our borders — because if we are honest with 
ourselves we know that is beyond our power”(Baum, 1996, p. 96). Carter agreed 
with the basic tenets of the white paper, which was released under the Ford 
Administration (Musto, 2002a, p. 208), and therefore, Carter took the 
unprecedented step of supporting the federal decriminalisation of marijuana 
(Sharp, 1992, p. 542). Carter differed greatly from Nixon and Reagan in that 
rather than making drug policy an issue of high public interest and a very visible 
part of his platform, the Carter approach was to “[emphasize] control of the issue 
by interests and experts within government, with less publicly visible attention 
given to the problem” (Sharp, 1994, p. 36). Aside from keeping the issue out of 
the public eye, Carter’s drug policy was based on three important themes: 1) a 
requirement “for a more comprehensive and balanced approach to the drug 
issue”; 2) a requirement “for rational discourse and research to overcome undue 
hysteria and false premises about the drug problem”, and 3) a requirement “to 
rationalize federal drug policy making through re-organization”(Sharp, 1994, p. 
37). This cool and rational approach, while quite logical from a policy 
perspective, did not take into account the large amount of emotion connected 
with drug policy issues. This oversight would, in the words of one commentator, 
“number among the nails in Carter’s political coffin” (Baum, 1996, p. 98).  
 Kingdon (2011, p. 154) found in his interviews that upwards of 80% of his 
interview respondents saw a change in presidential administration as a time of 
flux, when issues were more likely to either rise or fall in the political stream, 
which occurred twice in short succession — with the rapid rises and equally 
rapid falls of both the Ford and Carter Administrations — after Nixon’s 
impeachment. All of these changes in administration had the effect of turning 
over key personnel before they had a chance to become entrenched, which laid 
the way for a more demand-side approach to drug policy. 
 
Peter Bourne 
Peter Bourne is arguably the single most prominent figure in both policy and 
political streams during the liberal drug period of the 1970s. When still Governor 
of Georgia, Carter had appointed Bourne as head of the State’s drug program, and 
from there, Bourne took a senior position in SAODAP, but he left the job after two 
years in order to work on the Carter election campaign (Musto, 1999a, p. 260). 
This familiarity with the President, coupled with the fact that he was the first and 
only Drug Czar who was technically trained in the areas of mental health and 
substance abuse (Sharp, 1994, p. 37), has prompted some commentators to 
suggest that Peter Bourne was “the government’s highest ranking and most 
influential drug authority in the nation’s history” (Musto, 1999a, p. 260). Bourne 
was also quite outspoken in his opinion that the War on Drugs mentality needed 
to be revised. Bourne stated, “We have seen the past where criminal penalties 
have resulted in otherwise law-abiding young people spending time in prison 
and incurring permanent damage to their careers and their ability to enter 
professions. This causes far greater harm to their lives than any effect the drug 
would have had and the penalties are counter-productive” (Sharp, 1994, p. 43). 
 In comparison to Carter’s other policy advisors, Bourne was particularly 
optimistic about how receptive the American public would be to re-thinking the 
prohibitionist model. In preparation for Carter’s midterm strategy, Chief 
Domestic Policy Adviser Stuart Eizenstat was concerned about the tenor of the 
President’s message about marijuana, which he felt was “written in an almost 
laudatory tone”, and Eizenstat also felt that some sections “almost seem[ed] to 
be a positive recommendation of the drug”(Musto, 2002a, p. 195). There were 
even rumours that Bourne had written the parts of the midterm strategy that 
related to marijuana in conjunction with NORML (Musto, 2002a, p. 195). Carter 
did end up toning down some of what Bourne had prepared, on advice from the 
likes of Eizenstat and DuPont; indeed, the obvious fact that Bourne held a more 
liberal view at the helm of drug policy certainly helped decriminalisation rise 
higher in both policy and political streams.  
 It would be unfair to characterise Peter Bourne as an academic with no 
head for politics, as he was an integral part of Carter’s successful campaign for 
Presidency, yet two incidents in particular prompted one commentator to 
suggest he had a “lack of appreciation for the sensitivity of his position”(Musto, 
2002a, p. 215). Firstly, as a medical doctor, Bourne was legally allowed to 
prescribe medications, but when he prescribed Quaalude to a young female 
White House staff member, Ellen Mesky, in order to help her sleep, he gave her a 
false name in order to protect her job (Musto, 2002a, p. 215). In a very unusual 
turn of affairs, the pharmacist filling the prescription figured out that the 
prescription was under a bogus name, and this information made it into the 
media. What was particularly damaging was that this particular drug was also 
used heavily in the party disco scene and to enhance sexual experiences. This 
event certainly had a negative impact on Bourne’s credentials, but when he was 
accused by columnist Jack Anderson of taking cocaine at a NORML party on 
morning television, his credibility sank too low and his subsequent resignation 
became inevitable, because any drug policy initiatives would have been 
tarnished by his alleged involvement in the drug scene (Sharp, 1994, p. 44). 
 Indeed, while the tide was turning to a more conservative approach to 
drug policy, it has been suggested that Bourne was partly responsible for the 
shift in attitude: “the drug law reform movement vanished up Peter Bourne’s 
nose”(Sharp, 1994, p. 44). Peter Bourne’s career in governmental drug policy 
traces a very similar trajectory to the rise of liberal drug policies in the 1970s. As 
he was making his way up in SOADAP, the War on Drugs was losing popularity. 
When he eventually peaked as Drug Czar in the Carter White House, his greatest 
influence coincided with the greatest social and political acceptance of the harm 
reduction approach. As Bourne subsequently and quickly became a political 
outcast due to his indiscretions, the Parent Movement was gaining steam and the 




Questions of Jurisdiction and Consensus Building 
“Certainly we expect bureaucrats to defend their turf. When they do not, the 
event is certainly noticed, and can become very significant” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 
156). Bureaucrats did defend their turf during this time, and the squabbles 
between Customs and the DEA during the 1970s centred around jurisdiction, as 
the massive increase in federal drug spending was being doled out. This 
infighting had the effect of weakening the supply-side community and of opening 
up new political channels so that voices from the demand side were more clearly 
heard. 
 Kingdon (2011) notes that when legislative action looks more likely, there 
can be an element of competition as to who can put their name to a popular bill. 
This scenario has a similar dynamic to bandwagoning, but occurs when 
politicians or organisations compete to claim themselves as the origin of the 
movement for change. When this political environment occurs, it can greatly 
speed up the legislative process. This does not seem to have been a factor with 
regard to liberalising marijuana laws, and the absence of this factor could even 
be pointed to as evidence that the U.S. was still very far off federal 
decriminalisation. It seems that there was no great rush to put one’s organisation 
or political career on the line for this cause. A few individuals did, such as 
Senators Jacob, Cranston and Koch, but more than likely, this was a test of the 
political environment rather than a move they thought would actually result in 
meaningful change. When consensus building reaches a tipping point, “joining 
the coalition occurs not because one simply has been persuaded of the virtue of 
that course of action, but because one fears that failure to join would result in 
exclusion from the benefits of participation”(Kingdon, 2011, p. 159).   
 
Political Streams Conclusion 
In the 1970s, in both the policy and problem streams, the potential for federal 
marijuana decriminalisation became a prominent possible solution. It would 
seem, however, that in the world of politics, this option was still far from being 
seriously considered. Even with the positive media coverage of the proposed, 
more liberal drug laws, and the publication of the white paper, which suggested 
that the nation should not even aim for a drug-free society, the political reality 
for American society was one of inertia. The inertia held even in the face of the 
American Bar Association and the National Council of Churches advocating 
decriminalisation of marijuana, and it was clear that a move at the federal level 
was not likely. The long history of prohibition and the amount of emotional force 
needed to swing national mood on the drug issue has always kept savvy 
politicians from putting their names behind such a volatile issue, and even the 




Future Direction of Drug Policy 
 The majority of Obama’s term has been during a period of relative 
sympathy to liberal drug policies as the effects of a four-decade long war on 
drugs is becoming less popular. With regard to marijuana policy, this section 
briefly compares and contrasts the political and policy issues faced during 
Carter’s term, with those of the current day. 
 
Problem Stream 
During the Obama Administration it would seem that the problem of 
marijuana use has become less prominent and has been replaced in the problem 
stream, to a large degree, by the problem of marijuana prohibition. This shift in 
attitude is reminiscent of what occurred during the 1970s when Jimmy Carters 
Drug Czar, Peter Bourne, was quite vocal about this issue, believing that the laws 
surrounding marijuana were doing more harm than the drug itself. In 2010 
three-quarters of Americans believed the war on drugs to be a failed 
policy(Kreit, 2010, p. 559) having seen four decades of its increasing financial 
and social costs. 
 
The US has by far the largest prison population in the world, with a 
substantial number of these being for non-violent drug offenses and an 
estimated 40,000 relating to marijuana convictions(Caulkins et al., 2012, p. 50). 
A privatized prison system has given economic incentive for a strong lobbying 
force in Washington to fight to maintain long mandatory minimum sentences for 
drug offences(Eugene Jarecki, 2012) and this has disproportionately affected 
minorities with some states having incarceration rates 8 times higher for blacks 
than whites when it comes to Marijuana convictions.(Wegman, 2014) The 
judicial and policing system are straining under the large amount of marijuana 
related arrests, with FBI figures in 2012 showing that over twice as many arrests 
were made for Marijuana than for cocaine, heroin, and their derivatives 
combined.(The Editorial Board, 2014) 
 
 The price of this increase in policing and incarceration was another factor 
that has changed the perception from there being a problem with marijuana 
consumption, to being a problem with marijuana prohibition. President Regan 
with the just say no campaign essentially said that Nixon was on the right track 
with the drug war, but that it had not been fought with enough vigor, hence the 
huge increase in spending in this area during the 1980s. By the time Obama was 
in office however, the drug war had been well funded and supported by all 
administrations after Carter, so the argument that, if pursued with full vigor, the 
drug war would succeed was becoming less believable. Harvard economist 
Jeffery A. Miron estimates the amount spent on marijuana prohibition at $7.7 
billion annually(Christianson, 2010, p. 237). He also estimates that if marijuana 
was legalized that would provide an extra $6.2 billion in tax revenue to help deal 
with societal issues created by any extra marijuana users.  
 
 The prohibition of alcohol is often credited with the increase in organized 
crime in America, especially giving the Mafia a level of power and influence it 
may never have gained without it. As the drug cartels continue to gain power in 
Mexico, and as their influence increases across the border, parallels can be 
drawn between the prohibition of alcohol and the prohibition of marijuana as it 
is estimated by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy that 60% 
of Mexican drug cartel revenue is generated by the selling of black-market 
marijuana in the US.(Christianson, 2010, p. 237) Others argue that the majority 
of cartel funding and violence emanates from illegal markets for 
stimulants(Caulkins et al., 2012, p. 130) but even the more conservative authors 
of Marijuana Legalization: what everyone needs to know, concede that “in the 
long run, marijuana legalization would make a meaningful, but not decisive 
contribution to reduce the flow of funds to violent Mexican Drug Trafficking 
Organizations.”(Caulkins et al., 2012, p. 177) The increase in power of the drug 
cartels and their destabilizing influence factor in the change in attitude that sees 
prohibition rather than use of marijuana as the problem. 
 
 While the locking up of tens of thousands of non-violent offenders, the 
massive financial burden of the drug war, and the fact that organized crime 
syndicates do very well from the prohibition of marijuana, prominent drug 
policy scholars Bonnie and Whitebread contend that “the most compelling 
reason for modification or elimination of marijuana prohibition lies in its 
disastrous impact on the law as an institution.”(Christianson, 2010, p. 236)  As 
up to 100 million Americans have smoked Marijuana and a majority no longer 
support it being made illegal, there is an argument that not only the laws 
governing Marijuana, but all law, loses its potency due to this widespread law-
breaking(Christianson, 2010, p. 210).  
 
Certainly similar arguments were made during the Carter administration 
as to why marijuana prohibition was causing more problems than the use of 
cannabis, however, it would seem harder for a politician to say, as Reagan 
essentially did, that the fundamentals of the drug war are sound, but we just 
haven’t put enough resource and vigor into it. This argument had greater 
legitimacy at the beginning of the drug war, but one would be hard pressed to 
say that through the 80s and 90s there was a lack of commitment to 
prohibitionist drug policy. Those advocating decriminalization are less 
vulnerable now to a political movement that calls for a revitalized drug war than 
were those during the Carter Administration. The longer the racial inequalities of 
the drug war continue, and as the financial cost of these policies continues to 
climb with no real proof as to efficacy of these laws, the problem of marijuana 




Policy Stream under Obama 
When Jimmy Carter and Peter Bourne were advocating decriminalization 
of marijuana there were few other nations that had experimented with a 
liberalizing of their drug laws, thanks to the international influence of Anslinger 
and his strong prohibitionist policies. This meant that policy advisors during this 
era were unable to point to industrialized nations where liberal drug policies had 
been effective. This is not a problem that policy advisors have today however, as 
they can draw on data from a number of states that decriminalized marijuana, as 
well as the Netherlands, who went even further, but did not go all the way to 
fully legalizing the drug. While commentators disagree on the impact of these 
more liberal policies, predictions of a massive increase in drug use and crime has 
not accompanied them. A study by the World Health Organization concluded that 
while the US has the most punitive policies of 17 countries studied, it still had the 
highest rates of illegal drug use.(Kreit, 2010, p. 559) 
 Portugal decriminalized all drugs in 2001 and while some studies show a 
slight increase in drug use overall, the number of problematic drug users has 
been cut in half according to the Portuguese Ministry of Health(Hari, 2015, p. 
249). HIV transmission related to drug use has fallen by 32% and both the 
British Journal of Criminology and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs 
and Drug Addiction, who conducted extensive studies on the impact on 
decriminalization in Portugal, found that addiction, teenage drug use, and deaths 
due to drug use all fell after decriminalization.(Hari, 2015, p. 249)  When 
Colorado legalized sale and consumption of marijuana for recreational purposes 
crime rates fell in Denver from the previous year and $23.6 million was taken in 
taken in tax revenue(Downes, 2014). Seeing decriminalization policies working 
abroad and within the US adds credibility to those in the policy stream who 
advocate federal decriminalization of marijuana. 
 
 The decriminalization of marijuana in some states in the 1970s created a 
contradiction between state and federal law, but not to the degree that it was 
deemed necessary to reconcile this contradiction. When Colorado fully legalized 
their marijuana market this increased the gap between state and federal law, and 
while the Obama Administration and the DOJ has been hastily writing memos 
admonishing Federal Authorities not to intervene if there is no violation of state 
law, marijuana business still operate in an environment that is “quasi-pseudo-
hemi-demi legal.”(“How Not to Make a Hash Out of Cannabis Legalization,” 2014) 
“Banks and financial institutions, in particular, face tremendous legal uncertainty 
about the extent to which they may provide services to marijuana related 
business.”(Adler, 2014, p. 506) As marijuana related business grow and become 
major economic players in states where they are legal it is unlikely that the 
difference in state and federal law will be able to stand for decades as it did with 
decriminalization. 
 
 While the legalization of marijuana in the states will push the federal 
government to clarify its position in the near future, those in the policy stream 
that advocate legalization will be hard pressed to address the issue of how to 
avoid a big marijuana lobby that wields political power in a similar manner to big 
tobacco. As agricultural procedures improve it is estimated that a pound of high 
potency marijuana could go for as little as $20 whereas it currently sells for 
about $2,000 in California.(Kilmer, 2014, p. 259) Even with heavy taxation, the 
potential for a black market if taxation alone were to keep prices at levels to 
what they are currently is a particularly tough issue for analysts to deal with. As 
is similar with alcohol and tobacco users it is estimated that 80% of consumption 
of marijuana is by 20% of the using population which means that “profit 
maximizing companies will have strong incentives to create and retain heavy 
users.”(Kilmer, 2014, p. 260). 
 
 Those in the policy stream who advocate reform of the federal marijuana 
laws have an advantage over their counterparts in the 1970s in that they are able 
to point to jurisdictions where this has been adopted to positive effect decades 
ago. Now that some states have fully legalized, the pressure to maintain a stable 
economic environment that allows investors some kind of certainty that the 
business they invest in today will not be shut down by law enforcement 
tomorrow means that it is likely the next president will be pushed to at least 
decriminalize Marijuana, or leave it entirely up to the states to enforce. 
 
Politics stream under Obama 
 The Carter Administration’s drug policy program was derailed by a drug 
Czar and President who underestimated the powerful anti-drug feeling that 
Reagan was able to tap into. Advocates of legalization in contemporary times 
seemed to have learned from the era of the 1970s as they look to move away 
from stoner stereotypes. “the replacement of industry icon Tommy Chong(of 
Cheech and Chong fame) by the NCIA(National Cannabis Industry Association) 
seems to be an attempt to strengthen legitimacy via ‘dehippification’(authors 
term).”(Subritzky et al., 2016, p. 4) This move to seem more mainstream is wise, 
as the more the industry can blend in, the less prohibitionist groups will be able 
to rally their base. “Support for marijuana legalization is much less driven by 
moral conviction and much more by the belief that it is not a moral issue at 
all.”(Galston and Dionne Jr, 2013, p. 4) A series of New York Times articles that 
argued forcefully for the legalization of marijuana echoed a similar sentiment in 
saying that “Consuming Marijuana is not a fundamental right that should be 
imposed on the states by the federal government, in the manner of abortion 
rights, health insurance, or the freedom to marry a partner of either 
sex.”(Firestone, 2014) Because of the lack of moral force that can be put behind 
liberal drug laws it seems that the Obama administration has been prudent in 
simultaneously stating that while legalization is not in the Presidents 
vocabulary(Kreit, 2010, p. 561), he supports the legalization in Colorado and 
Washington.(Firestone, 2014) In reality, a change in the Federal law regarding 
Marijuana would not, in and of itself, make a big difference, as the vast majority 
of arrests for marijuana possession are executed at the state level. In 2008 state 
law enforcement arrested 754,223, while Federally there were 626. Politically 
however, drug policy is still a hot issue, especially as the opioid epidemic 
becomes more widespread and covered in the media. Historically drug policy has 
been dealt with as a monolithic issue, and as the increase in heroin and 
prescription opioid deaths continues, this could make those pushing for 
marijuana law reform vulnerable to arguments about the gate-way drug theory. 
If the President came out in favor of Federally decriminalizing or legalizing it 
would certainly strengthen the cause of those on the liberal side of drug policy, 
however it could also add momentum to those wishing to continue with 
prohibition. This occurred during the Carter Administration as the Parents 
Movement formed in part, because they felt the government was sending the 
wrong message to teens in advocating for decriminalization.  
 
Conclusion 
 During the Obama administration cultural and political problems 
regarding marijuana have started to focus on the issues that are created by its 
prohibition, rather than its use. While this shift in thinking occurred during the 
Carter administration, it seems there are greater forces pushing for the repeal of 
prohibition in the current climate than there was under Carter. The increase in 
the prison population, and the disproportionate amount of minorities 
incarcerated for drug crimes since the 1970s has grown dramatically. This has 
started to sway public opinion as many activists push for prison reform and link 
this to unfair drug policies. The financial costs of the war on drugs, coupled with 
the lack of tax take from a legalized market help create a climate in which 
marijuana policy is re-evaluated, especially after the financial shocks of 2008. As 
Mexico is increasingly destabilized by drug cartels who gain the majority of their 
funding from illicit drug markets in the US, and as the majority of the population 
see the war on drugs as a failure, the pressure to change drug law continues to 
mount. 
 During Carters Presidency, there were few other industrialized nations 
that had experimented with liberal drug policies, but in the present day 
politicians can look at the impact of a number of states that decriminalized in the 
1970s as well as the close to legal market in the Netherlands, and Portugal’s 
decriminalization of all drugs. For the most part, these liberal policies have been 
successful. Possibly the most potent factor that will push for the 
decriminalization of marijuana, if not its legalization, at the federal level is the 
tension that exists between state and federal law as states continue to fully 
legalize. As investment in this growth industry continues, there will be pressure 





The theory of policy windows is a useful framework to apply in order to 
understand what forces were at play that pushed the federal decriminalization of 
marijuana to the governmental agenda during the Carter Administration. The 
strength of the theory lies in its ability to map the political and social landscape 
in order to see where an issue is likely to falter on its journey to being dealt with 
in the legislature. The breadth of the theory is also its weakness, as critics assert 
that it is so unspecific as to not allow for the comparison between different areas 
of policy, or even between different points in history. The tension between 
applying a theory that is so specific it does not take into account the vast range of 
factors that affect the legislative process, and choosing a theory that is so broad 
that one cannot draw comparison to other areas of policy is not an easy 
methodological issue to solve. In this case however, it would seem that Kingdon’s 
theory falls somewhere between being too overly specific and being too vague.  
 Under the Carter Administration politicians, and the public in general, 
started to question whether the laws governing marijuana were doing more 
harm than the drug itself. This meant that the problem of marijuana use was 
increasingly being seen as the problem of marijuana prohibition. This allowed 
those in the policy stream who had been advocating harm reduction approaches 
to have their voice heard in the political stream. While the problem of 
prohibition had risen in the problem stream, and the solution of federal 
decriminalization had risen in the policy stream, there were factors in the 
politics stream that did not allow for legislative action to take place. The 
discussion of federal decriminalization stayed relatively quiet for 3 decades after 
Carter, but under the Obama administration the discussion has resurfaced. Many 
of the factors that pushed this issue in the 1970s are present today, but the 
continued failure of the war on drugs along with the rising costs of incarceration 
and the economic incentive to legalize marijuana mean that federal law reform is 







Adler, J.H., 2014. Marijuana, Federal Power and the States. Case W Res Rev 65, 
505. 
Almond, G.A., Genco, S.J., 1977. Clouds, clocks, and the study of politics. World 
Polit. 29, 489–522. 
Anslinger, H.J., Oursler, W., 1961. The murderers: the story of the narcotic gangs. 
Farrar, Straus and Cudahy. 
Baum, D., 1996. Smoke and mirrors: The war on drugs and the politics of failure. 
Little, Brown New York. 
Blackman, S.J., 2004. Chilling out: the cultural politics of substance consumption, 
youth and drug policy. Open University Press, Maidenhead. 
Bonnie, R.J., Whitebread, C.H., 1974a. The marihuana conviction: A history of 
marihuana prohibition in the United States. University Press of Virginia 
Charlottesville, VA. 
Bonnie, R.J., Whitebread, C.H., 1974b. The marihuana conviction: A history of 
marihuana prohibition in the United States. University Press of Virginia 
Charlottesville, VA. 
Buxton, J., 2006. The political economy of narcotics: production, consumption 
and global markets. Zed Books. 
byJOHN MAYNARD, K., 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money. 
Caulkins, J.P., Hawken, A., Kilmer, B., Kleiman, M.A.R., 2012. Marijuana 
Legalization:What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford University Press. 
Chomsky, N., 2010. Hopes and prospects. Haymarket Books. 
Christianson, M.A., 2010. Great Schism: Social Norms and Marijuana Prohibition, 
A. Harv Pol Rev 4, 229. 
Commission, S., others, 1972. Marijuana: Signal of Misunderstanding. First Rep. 
Natl. Comm. Marijuana Drug Abuse US Gov. Print. Off. Wash. DC. 
Downes, L., 2014. The Great Colorado Weed Experiment. N. Y. Times. 
Drugs and politics, 1977. . Transaction Books, New Brunswick, N.J. 
Earleywine, M., 2002. Understanding marijuana: a new look at the scientific 
evidence. Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York ; Auckland [N.Z.]. 
Eldridge, W.B., 1962. Narcotics and the law: A critique of the American 
experiment in narcotic drug control. American Bar Foundation New York. 
Erlen, J., Spillane, J.F., 2004. Federal drug control: the evolution of policy and 
practice. Routledge. 
Eugene Jarecki, 2012. The House I live in. 
Falco, M., 1996. U. S. Drug Policy: Addicted to Failure. Foreign Policy 120–133. 
Firestone, D., 2014. Let States Decide on Marijuana. N. Y. Times. 
Force, D.C. (U S.) D.A.T., 1975. White Paper on Drug Abuse, September 1975: A 
Report to the President from the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task 
Force. Task Force. 
Galston, W.A., Dionne Jr, E.J., 2013. The new politics of marijuana legalization: 
Why opinion is changing. Gov. Stud. Brook. BrookingsWOLA 1. 
Goldstein, T., 1977. Backing Grows for Easing Marijuuana Laws. N. Y. Times. 
Goode, E., 1970. The marijuana smokers. Basic Books (AZ). 
Hall, W., 2004. Cannabis use and dependence: public health and public policy. 
Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Hari, J., 2015. Chasing the scream: The first and last days of the war on drugs. 
Bloomsbury Publishing USA. 
Harrison, L.D., Backenheimer, M., Inciardi, J.A., 1995. Cannabis use in the United 
States: Implications for policy. Cent. Drug Alcohol Stud. Univ. Del. 
Hirschman, A.O., others, 1971. A bias for hope. Yale university press New Haven. 
How Not to Make a Hash Out of Cannabis Legalization [WWW Document], 2014. . 
Wash. Mon. URL 
http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchaprilmay-2014/how-
not-to-make-a-hash-out-of-cannabis-legalization/ (accessed 7.17.16). 
Jaiani, V., Whitford, A.B., 2011. Policy windows, public opinion, and policy ideas: 
the evolution of No Child Left Behind. Qual. Assur. Educ. 19, 8–27. 
Jonnes, J., 1996. Hep-cats, narcs, and pipe dreams: a history of America’s 
romance with illegal drugs. Scribner, New York, NY. 
Kaplan, J., 1970. Marijuana–the new prohibition. World Publishing Company 
New York. 
Kilmer, B., 2014. Policy designs for cannabis legalization: starting with the eight 
Ps. Am. J. Drug Alcohol Abuse 40, 259–261. 
doi:10.3109/00952990.2014.894047 
Kingdon, J.W., 2011. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Longman 
Publishing Group. 
Kingdon, J.W., 1984. Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Little, Brown, 
Boston. 
King, R., 1972. The drug hang-up: America’s fifty-year folly. Norton New York. 
Kreit, A., 2010. Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws 
in an Age of State Reforms. Chapman Law Rev. 13, 555. 
Levinson, M.H., 2002. The drug problem: a new view using the general semantics 
approach. Praeger, Westport, Conn. 
Mucciaroni, G., 1992. The Garbage Can Model & the Study of Policy Making: A 
Critique. Polity 24, 459–482. doi:10.2307/3235165 
Musto, D.F., 2002a. The quest for drug control: politics and federal policy in a 
period of increasing substance abuse, 1963-1981. Yale University Press, 
New Haven. 
Musto, D.F., 2002b. Drugs in America: A documentary history. NYU Press. 
Musto, D.F., 1999a. The American disease: Origins of narcotic control. Oxford 
University Press (New York). 
Musto, D.F., 1999b. The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control. Oxford 
University Press. 
Musto, D.F., 1973. The American disease: origins of narcotic control. Yale 
University Press, New Haven. 
Nelson, H., 2007. Does a crisis matter? Forest policy responses to the mountain 
pine beetle epidemic in British Columbia. Can. J. Agric. Econ. Can. 
Agroeconomie 55, 459–470. 
Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 1989. 
National Drug Control Strategy. 
Reiman, A., n.d. The Fallacy of a One Size Fits All Cannabis Policy. 
REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 2 OF 1973 [WWW Document], n.d. URL 
http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-
node83-leaf181&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed 6.23.16). 
Rex, J., Jackson, D.J., 2009. Window of Opportunity? Internet Gambling in Canada. 
Can. Public Policy 35, 121–137. 
Robinson, M.B., Scherlen, M.B.R.R.G., 2007. Lies, Damned Lies, and Drug War 
Statistics: A Critical Analysis of Claims Made by the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy. SUNY Press. 
Rosenberger, L., 1996. America’s drug war debacle. Avebury, Aldershot, Hants, 
England ; Brookfield, Vt. 
Saint-Germain, M.A., Calamia, R.A., 1996. Three strikes and you’re in: A streams 
and windows model of incremental policy change. J. Crim. Justice 24, 57–
70. 
Sharp, E.B., 1994. The dilemma of drug policy in the United States. HarperCollins 
College Publishers. 
Sharp, E.B., 1992. Agenda-Setting and Policy Results. Policy Stud. J. 20, 538–551. 
Simon, M.V., Aim, L.R., 1995. Policy windows and two-level games: explaining the 
passage of acid-rain legislation in the Clean Air Act of 1990. Environ. Plan. 
C 13, 459–478. 
Slaughter, J.B., 1987. Marijuana Prohibition in the United States: History and 
analysis of a failed policy. Colum JL Soc Probs 21, 417. 
Solecki, W.D., Shelley, F.M., 1996. Pollution, political agendas, and policy 
windows: environmental policy on the eve of Silent Spring. Environ. Plan. 
C 14, 451–468. 
Subritzky, T., Pettigrew, S., Lenton, S., 2016. Issues in the implementation and 
evolution of the commercial recreational cannabis market in Colorado. 
Int. J. Drug Policy 27, 1–12. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2015.12.001 
The Editorial Board, 2014. The New York Times Calls for Marijuana Legalization. 
N. Y. Times. 
The new war on drugs: symbolic politics and criminal justice policy, 1998. , 
ACJS/Anderson monograph series. Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences ; 
Anderson Publishing Co, Highland Heights, KY : Cincinnati, OH. 
Trujillo, C.W., 2011. Marijuana, Mexico and the media. Humboldt State 
University. 
Tyrrell, I., 1997. The US prohibition experiment: myths, history and implications. 
Addiction 92, 1405–1409. 
Wegman, J., 2014. The Injustice of Marijuana Arrests. N. Y. Times. 
Winterbourne, M., n.d. United States drug policy: The scientific, economic, and 
social issues surrounding marijuana. 
Zimring, F.E., 1992. The search for rational drug control, An Earl Warren Legal 
Institute study. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; New York. 
 
